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,juprtutt Qlllurt llf tlrt 'J:ni:ttb ~tattg 
Jlasqittgfmt.10. Ql. 2ll~Jk~ 
November 1, 19.78 
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL 
Subject: A-417, Rogers v. Lodge 
(Application tor Stay Pending CA Appeal} 
Federal/Civil 
Immediate Situation: Applicants, representing Burke 
County, Ga., seek a stay pending appeal to CA 5 of the 
order of USDC (SD Ga.) (Alaimo) directing that a special 
election be held on November 7, 1978, to fill single-
district seats on the county ?oard of Elections, under a 
plan adopted by the DC after it found that the existing 
at-large system unconstitutionally diluted the voting 
strength of black voters. The DC and CA 5 (order, 
Thornberry, Godbold, Rubin) denied stays. 
Facts and DC Decision: The county has elected its 
commissioners at large since 1911; there is no claim that 
this system was created with discriminatory purpose but 
the DC found it was being maintained for tnat purpose. The 
five commissioners are elected together every four tY~ars, 
and run for specified numbered positions. No black h~s 
ever been elected, although historically the county has 
had more blacks than whites, Respondents, all black 
citizens ot the county, challenged the use of numbered 
positions (which was begun in 1964 pursuant to general 
state law), majority vote, run-offs, and election at large. 
The DC found that the present system violated the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, relying primarily on 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA 5), aff'd sub nom 
East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424""""'U:"S-:---636 
(1976). Applying Zimmer's multifactor circumstantial 
evidence test, the DC found the following ''primary" factors: 
a history of past discrimination; unresponsiveness of elected 
officials; depressed socio-economic status of blacks; lack 
of black access to the political process; and neutral state 
policy towards at-large election. The following factors 
enhanced the dilution: the large size of the county; the 
requirement of election by majority vote and election to 
specific positions; and the lack of a residency requirement. 
The satisfaction of these criteria raise an inference 
of discriminatory intent. 
I 
.. 
The DC adopted the plan submitted by the respondents, cut short 
the four-year terms to which the present commissioners had been 
elected in 1976, and directed the special election. 
The DC denied a stay because there was ample time for the 
county to overcome any administrative problems; the plan selected 
tracks the district lines of an existing militia district; and 
further denial or postponement of the rights of black 
citizens is not justified. 
Applicants' Contentions: Applicants intend to raise on appeal 
at least the following issues: whether the doctrine of dilution 
applies to districting plans of county and municipal bodies; 
whether the requirement of discriminatory intent was satisfied; 
whether there is such a requirement; whether the DC should have 
afforded local officials an opportunity to devise their own 
plan; and whether the plan adopted dilutes white voting strength. 
Discussion: This case appears to present the issues before 
the Court in Williams v. Brown, No. 78-357, probable jurisdiction 
noted October 30, 1978, and City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 77-1844, 
noted October 2, 1978. It also presents the issue noted in Justice 
Rehnquist's ~~diiiag opinion in Wise v. Lipscomb, No. 77-529, 
decided June 22, 1978, in which you, the Chief Justice, and Justice 
Stewart joined. These facts would seem to justify a stay, although 
you might want to refer the application to Friday's Conference, 
particularly because we have not yet received a response. 
I recommend that you refer this to Friday's Conference. 
There is no response; however, respondents have told the Clerk's 
office that they will try to mail their response today, by express 
mail, for delivery tomorrow. 





November 3, 1978 Conference.,.... "~~ _ .'_ -~· 1- _ ""d~t ' · 
Second Supplemental List ~ · ~  
No. A-417 ~ ~ ~~cation for Stay Pending 
~ ~t J-.,;...., -Appeal to CA 5, Presented to 
ROGERS (representln~ Burk~ r ~ Justice Powell and by him 
County, Ga. ~ 7 ~ Referred to the Court 
~~~'r"', 
LODGE (and all black ~ ~ ,l)c:::_ s ~ ~ 
citizens of county) ~~~ · ~ ~ 
 4C¢' 1 'L ~ .C"""C....(_ ~ 
SUMMARY: Applicants s e ek stay pending appeal to CA 5 
of the order of c~ecial 
v. 
· ... .  
election be held on November 7, 1978, to fill single-district 
seats on the ~ounty Board of Commissioners, unde! a plan adopted 
by the DC after finding that the existing at-large system unconsti-
tutionally di~uted the voting strength of black voters. The DC 
and CA 5 (order, Thornberry, Godbold, Rubin) denied stays. 
FACTS: - The county has had an at-large system since 191~ 
There are five ·-commissioners, who are elected together every four 
years. Each candidate runs for a specified numbered position, and 





added in 1964, pursuant to a general state statute. Candidates may 
reside anywhere in the county. No black has ever been elected, 
although historically blacks have been in the majority (ranging from 
78% in 1930 to 58% in 1975). ofl-,., ~ -
Resps brought this suit in April, 1976; _the bench trial ranA 
from June to September 1978. On September 29, the DC held that the 
present commissioners had been unconstitutionally elected in 1976; 
adopted the districting plan proposed by resps; and ordered that a 
special election be held at the general election scheduled for six 
weeks hence. On October 26, the DC issued its findings and conclu-
sions. 
DC DECISION: The DC found that the at-large system violated 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, relying primarily on 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA 5), aff'd sub nom East Carroll 
Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). Although the 
existing scheme of electing county commissioners was racially neutral 
when adopted, it was being maintained for invidious purposes. This 
the DC inferred from application of Zimmer's multi-factor circumstan-
tial evidence test. The DC found the following "primary" factors: 
a history of past discrimination; unresponsiveness of elected 
officials; -depressed socio-economic status o~ blacks; lack of black 
access to the political process; and neutral state policy towards 
at-large election. The following factors enhanced the dilution: the 
large size of the county; the requirementsof election by majority 
vote and election to specific positions; and the lack of a residency 
requirement·; -
The DC ad<;pted the ~tricting plan submitted by resps; it was 
held "superior~' to that:_ - o-~ -ap_2licants because the population deviation 
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between districts was substantially less. 
The DC denied a stay because there was ample time for the 
county to overcome any administrative problems (the plan tracked the 
district lines of an existing militia-district) and because further 
denial of postponement of the rights of black_ citizens was not 
justified. 
APPLICANTS CONTENTIONS: Applicants intend to raise on appeal 
at least the following issues~hether the ~octrine of di~on 
applies to distrjlcting plans of county and municipal bodies; . whether 
the requiremen; of ~~riminat:ry intent was satisfie~hether the 
DC should have afforded local officials an opportunity to devise 
their own plan; whether the DC should have rejected the remedial 
plan submitted by applicants without having first found it to be 
invalid; and whether the plan adopted dilutes white voting strength. 
As grounds for a stay, applicants assert the substantial 
likelihood of success on appeal (or on cert). Implementation of 
this plan pending appeal will cause the county and its citizens 
irreparable harm because the newly elected commissioners will answer 
to a s~a!l, single district constituency, and may even direct that 
lo4oq ..- ........--._. ,__ --- - ,._, ,..., ............... 
the appeal be dismissed. Resps can -show no irrepa~able injury, 
... -~ --- ~ 
because at- most the system in existence for 67 years will remain, with 
blacks free to vote without hindrance and with the ability to control 
the outcome (if the appeals ~ast beyond 1980). 
DISCUSSION: This case appears to present the issues presently 
before the Court in Williams v. Brown, No. 78-357, probable jurisdic-
_tion noted October 30, 1978, and City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 77-1844, 
noted October 2, 1978, and the issue noted in Justice Rehnquist's 
- 4 -
separate opinion in Wise v. Lipscomb, No. 77-529, decided June 22, 
1978. These facts would seem to justify a stay. However, the 
Court probably should wait for the response, which was mailed from 
Georgia at 10 p.m. on November 1 (by express mail), possibly even 
if it means waiting until Monday, November 6-*/ 
A response is in the mail. 
11/2/78 Richman 
PJC 
DC order and Op 
and CA order in 
applic. 
*/It would lead to chaos if the Court granted a stay Friday, and then 
nad to vacate it Monday, after consideration of the response; it 
would be better _to delay the decision initially to avoid that ~isk . 
.:-* 
November 3, 1978 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . A-417 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced .. .. ... . ...... . . , 19 .. . 
QUENTIN ROGERS 





Brennan, J .......... ... ........ .... .. . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J ......................... . 
Powell, J ........................... . 
Rehnquist, J ... ... ..... . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
vs. 
HERMAN LODGE 
to Justice Powell and by him referred to 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMEN'l' 




ABSENT NOT VOTING 
G D 
.... ... ....... 41:1 ~~i;J ·. i v. .... ......... .. ......... . 
.. . .. ... ...... . 1:• ......... 7 ............. ·········· 
::::::::::: :·.·.·.·.·. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .. ·.·.·.··.~~.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.··.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
................. ... ..... ~ .. • ............ ·· ······ ·· 
~ 
························· ~·········· ············ · ·· 
············· .......... . '.;"' ························ 
. ........................... ""./ " .................. . 
~uprttttt <!fanrt of tltt ~b ;%httts 
~rut4i:ngLttt. ~. <If. 2llp'!~ 
November 6, 1978 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE 
Subject: Rogers v. Lodge, A-417 
On Friday, the Court stayed the election which the DC had 
ordered to be held tomorrow. November 3, 1978 Conference, p. 15a. 
The response to the application has now been received. 
Respondents argue primarily that the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the finding .of dilution; that the remedy was not too 
drastic and was well within the DC's powers; and that there is 
accordingly little chance of reversal on appeal. Respondents also 
argue that the evidence showed statutory violations, but the DC 
did not address those claims in view of its constitutional holding. 
As mitigating against a stay, respondents point out that the election 
campaign has been completea and that the candidates have spent 
a considerable amount of time and money. 
Nothing in the . ~esponse changes the premises upon which 
the Court acted on Friday. 
A copy o;£; the response ;ls attached. 
Marc Richman 
Note: A reply to the ~esponse was just received. It responds to · severa: 
fact statements in the response, but has little else to add. 
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REC ElVED 
IN THE 
\ ~ 0' 1 \ l 
i 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFflCE pF THE CLE~5 I 
SUPRE E COURT, U.::J 
OCTOBER TERM 1978 
QUENT IN ROGERS, RAY DELAIGLE, ROBERT L. 
\v m STER, CHARLES H. KITCHENS , AND 
TtfOMAS M. LOVETT, AS MEMBERS OF THE 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA, 
AND A. HOLLAND GNANN, OTTO B. JOHNSON AND 
WALL T. THOMPSON, AS MEMBERS OF THE 
BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA 
APPLICANTS 
VS: 
HERMA~ LODGE, SHELLEY COLEMAN, LIZZIE M. SAMS, 
K. C. CHILDERS, REV. DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE 
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY AND LEVI CRANFORD 
RESPONDENTS 
APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF AN ORDER 
OF THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ORDERING A SPECIAL 
ELECTION OF ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA, 
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1978 
( tc:·2. ~ tJ'f 4- I Uf.J""() - (f K h l~t(/' 
P. 0. Box 88 
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 
Tel: 912/554-3955 
P. 0. Box 896 
Elberton, Georgia 30635 
Tel: 404/283-2651 
PRESTON B. LEWIS 
LEWIS & LEWIS 
E. FREEMAN LEVERETT 
HEARD, LEVERETT & ADAMS 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS 
I 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
QUENTIN ROGERS, et al 
Applicants NO. __________________ __ 
VS: 
HERMAN LODGE, et al OCTOBER TERM, 1978 
Respondents 
A'l?PLIC,"\TION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF AN ORDER 
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ORDERING A SPECIAL 
ELECTION OF ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF 
CO~iiSSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA 
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1978 
TO THE HONORABLE LEWIS F. POWELL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
Come now Applicants, defendants in the District Court 
below, and pursuant to Rule 51 of the Rules of this Court, move 
for a st.ay pending appeal of the final judgment and injunction 
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Georgia, Augusta Division, on September 29, 1978, 
declaring unconstitutional an Act of the General Assembly of 
Georgia (Ga. Laws 1911, p. 380) providing for the election at-
large of the five (5) members of the Board of Commissioners 
of Burke County, Georgia, ordering the terms of the five in-
cumbents elected for four (4) year terms in 1976 to be cut in 
half, and ordering that a special election be held on November 7, 
1978, to elect successors for the incumbent commissioners, to 
take office on January 1, 1979, and by way of grounds therefor, 
show as follows: 
/. 
1. 
Un~ess stayed, the order as entered by the Court below 
will be effectuated at the November General Election to be 
held on November 7, 1978, within less than one week, and there-
fore t i me is of the essence. Consequently, the Court should act 
immediately to grant the stay. 
2. 
App l ication for stay was made to the district court 
and denied on October 10, 1978. Application to the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was denied on October 26, 1978, 
and received by applicants on October 29, 1978. 
3. 
The effect of the injunction entered below is to strike 
down an election system which has been in effect in Burke County, 
Georgia for 67 years, and which the district court below found 
was racially neutral when adopted (Findings, p. 7). The basis 
of the Court's '.decision was that the county-wide or at-large 
voting system in Burke County unconstitutionally diluted the 
strength of black votes, within the meaning of a number of de-
cisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, beginning with Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (C.A. 
5th 1973), aff'd sub nom Eas·t · Carroll' Parish School Board v. 
Marshall, 424 u.s. 636 (1976), "but without approval of the 
constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals" (424 
u.s. at 638). 
4. 
By way of relief, the district court, without a 
hearing thereon, ordered into effect a plan submitted by plain-
tiffs which purports to divide Burke County into five districts 
-2-
of equal population, but deliberately gerrymandered so as 
(1) Create two districts containing 74.9 and 77.6% black popula-
tion, designed to insure election of 2 black candidates~ 
(2) Place three (3) 1 of the present white incumbents in the 
largest black district (Dist. No. 1, 77.6% black - see Findings, 
p. 28), so as to dilute the white voting strength, while 
( 3) Carefully placing two of the black plaintiffs in the t ·wo 
separate, overwhelmingly black districts to avoid their having 
to run against each other. The two plaintiffs, Messrs. Herman 
Lodge and Woodrow Harvey, have qualified to run from the two 
overwhelmingly black districts, Harvey in District 1, and Lodge 
in Distr i ct 2. Consequently, rather than remedying racial 
voting dilution , the Court's order below has mandated it in . an 
egregious· ·, ~·orm . 
1. The deliberate, intentional election rigging purpose of 
plaintiffs' plan, adopted by the district court below, is 
graphically demonstrated by events transpiring below in 
connection with submissions of the plaintiffs' plans. As 
originally filed, the Complaint erroneously named "Raymond 
DeLaigle" as one of the 5 Conunissioners. Raymond DeLaigle was 
not a Commissioner,: but was a retired clerk of the Superior 
Court \-lho lives on the West side of Ga. Highway 56. The 
proper defendant should-niVe been "Ray DeLaigle", who lives 
just across the road from Raymond DeLaigle on the East side of 
Ga. Highway 56. At an early stage in the proceedings, the 
district judge below directed the parties to submit proposed 
plans for use in the event the Court should rule for plaintiffs. 
The plan then submitted by plaintiffs, and finally adopted by the 
Court below, included three white incumbents in District 1 
(77.6% black), and the same "Raymond DeLaigle", erroneously 
named as a defendant Commissioner, who lives on the west side of 
Georgia Highway 56. At the conclusion of the trial on September 
12, 1978, the district court directed the parties to submit plans. 
This time, having discovered that the proper defendant was "Ray 
DeLaigle" and not "Raymond DeLaigle", plaintiffs submitted a 
modification of their plan which differed only slightly by shift-
ing the line from Highway 56 to a point just east of State 
Highway 56, for the purpose of including Ray DeLaigle in Distric 
1, thereby placing 4 of the 5 white incumbents in the same dis-
trict. Shortly after announcing his order, the district judge 
left on vacation, and counsel for defendants were advised by the 
district judge's law clerk that the judge had made an error in 
ordering defendants to use the original plan, but really intend-
ed to order in effect the revised plan which placed 4 incumbents 
in the same district. 
-3-
5. 
This case was instituted on April 5, 1976, by Herman 
Lodge, and seven (7) other black citizens of Burke County, 
Georgia, against the five individuals constituting the Board of 
Commissioners of Burke County, as well as the probate judge of 
2 said County, and was brought under 42 USCA 1983, attacking the 
county-wide method of electing the five members of the Board 
of Commiss ion<>rs, the governing authority of Burke County, 
Georgia, as being an unconstitutional dilution of black voting 
power in said county. 
6. 
The trial commenced in Augusta, Georgia, on June 22, 
1978, and after several recesses, was finally concluded in 
Brunswick, Georgia, on September 12, 1978. 
7. 
On September 29, 1978, the district court entered 
order holding that plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and 
ordering that a special election be held at the same time as 
the General Election for Governor and u. s. Congressmen on 
November 7, 1978, at which time successors to the five (5) 
incumbent members of the Board of Commissioners would be elected 
to take office in January, 1979, and serve for a two year term 
until their successors are elected at the general election to 
be held in November, 1980, when elections for Commissioners are 
regularly scheduled by law. As the incumbent commissioners were 
all elected in 1976 to serve four (4) year terms, the effect of 
2. By order entered July 28, 1976, theCourt dropped Mrs. Mary 
Herrington, probate judge of Burke County as a party defendant, 
and substituted in her place the three (3) members of the 
recently created Board of Elections (Ga. Laws 1975, Vol. II, 
p. 4506), which assumed the duties of holding elections pre-
viously exercised by the probate judge. 
-4-
the order was to cut these four (4) year terms in half, and 
order that a special election be held within the short period 
of approximately five (5) weeks. The order also recites that 
findings of fact and conclusions of law had not then been 
prepared, but would be filed later. A copy of said order is 
attached hereto, marked "Exhibit A" and by reference is made a 
part hereof. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were later 
entered on October 26, 1978, and a copy is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit B". 
8. 
The order further provides that Burke County will be 
divided into five (5) districts, with one member to be elected 
from each dist r i ct by the qualified voters thereof, according 
to a plan submitted by plaintiffs as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300. 
In so doing, the district court adopted a plan submitted by 
plaintiffs in lieu of plans submitted by defendants without 
having first found and declared such latter plans to be invalid 
or insufficient in law, contrary to the ruling in Wise v. 
Lipscomb, __ u.s. ___ , 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). 
9. 
Notice of appeal was filed below on October 2, 
1978, and an amended notice was filed on or about October 11, 
1978. 
10. 
The plan struck down by the district court was one 
which had been in effect in Burke County for 67 years, having 
been enacted in 1911 (Ga. Laws 1911, p. 380). 3 
3. In 1929, the Act was amended to provide for appointment 
of the 5 commissioners by the grand jury in 1932 {Ga. Laws 
1929, p. 548), but before the Act was ever put into effect, 
it was again amended in 1931 so as to revert back to election 
by the people (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 400). 
-5-
11. 
The evidence without dispute shows that the Act of 
1911 (Ga. Laws 1911, p. 380) was enacted without any purpose 
to discriminate on the basis of race. The district court below 
held that the present scheme was racially neutral when 
adopted (Findings, p. 7). 
12. 
The decision of the district court in this case 
therefore strikes down a law and election plan in effect for 67 
years without the showing of intentional discrimination held 
requisite in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Dayton 
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 53 L.Ed.2d 851, 859 (1977); 
. . 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Metropolitan School District v. 
Buckley, 429 u.s. 1068 (1977); Austin Indep. School District 
v. United States, 429 u.s. 990 (1976); and compare Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 413 u.s. 189, 208 (1973); and is there-
fore error. 
13. 
In striking down the 67 year old Burke County election 
plan in this case which the district court admitted was not 
enacted for a discriminatory purpose, the Court below purported 
to follow a line of decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which began with Zimmer v. 
McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (C.A. 5th 1973), aff'd sub nom ("but 
without approval of the constitutional views expressed by the 
Court of Appeals"), and which was decided before this Court's 
decision in Washington v. Davis, supra, decided in 1976. Zimmer 
v. McKeithen was- decided under the now discarded discriminatory 
-6-
"impact" or "effect" test, for in that case, the Court stated 
the test to be "that designedly or otherwise, an apportionment 
scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would 
operat~ to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial 
or political elements of the voting population. " 485 F2d 
at 1304 (emphasis supplied). In order to apply this "effect" 
or "impact" standard the Court articulated a list of 4 con-
siderat:ions which have come to be known as the "Zimmer criteria", 
and four enhancing factors, . viz. 
"* * * where a minority can demonstrate a 
lack of access to the process of slating 
candidates, the unresponsiveness of legis-
lators to their particularized interests, 
a tenuous state policy underlying the pre-
ference for multi-member or at-large 
districting, or that the existence of 
past discrimination in general precludes 
the effective participation in the election 
system, a strong case is made. Such proof 
is enhanced by a showing of the existence 
of large districts, majority vote require-
ments, anti-single shot voting provisions 
and the lack of provision for at-large 
candidates running from particular geo-
graphical subdistricts. The fact of dilu-
tion is established upon proof of the 
existence of an aggregate of these factors. 
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement 
in White v. Regester, supra, demonstrates, 
however, that all these factors need not 
be proved in order to obtain relief." 




This same "discriminatory impact" approach has been 
applied unremittingly in a number of subsequent decisions. 
Paige v. Gray, 538 F2d 1108 (C.A. 5th 1976); Wallace v. House, 
538 F2d 1138 (C.A. 5th 1976); Parnell v. Rapides Parish School 
Board, 563 F2d 180 (C.A. 5th 1977); Kirksey v. Board cf Super-
visors, 554 F2d 139 (C.A. 5th 1977), cert. den . 54 L.Ed.2d 454 
(1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F2d 923 (C.A. 5th 1977); Nevett 
v. Sides, 533 F2d 1361 (C.A. 5th 1976); United States v. 
Supervisors of Forrest County, Mississippi, 571 F2d 951 (C.A. 
5th 1978); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F2d 209 (C.A. 5th 1978); Bolden 
v. City o f Mobil e, 571 F2d 238 (C.A. 5th 1978); Blacks United 
v. Shrevepor t, 571 F2d 248 (C.A. 5th 1978); and Thomasville 
Branch, NAACP v . Thomas County, 571 F2d 257 (C.A. 5th 1978). 
In Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, supra, the en bane Court 
held that racially gerrymandered districting was mandated in 
plans designed as a remedy for existing election schemes 
found to be unconstitutional under the dilution doctrine (554 
F2d at 151). 
14. 
In four decisions decided March 29, 1978, a panel 
of the Court of Appeals took note of this Court's holdings 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a case of intentional 
discrimination must be shown, and held that whether considered 
under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, intentional dis-
crimination must also be shown in order to establish a case of 
unconstitutional dilution. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F2d 209, 217-
221 (C.A. 5th 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, supra; Blacks 
United v. City of Shreveport, supra; Thomasville Branch, NAACP 
v. Thomas County, supra~ ~~ ,~~ that in the Mobile 
and Thomas County, Georgia, cases, the at-large plan had not 
been enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose, the Court 
nevertheless held that a case of dilution could be established 
-8-
on a showing that the at-large plan had been maintained for such 
a purpose, and that the Zimmer criteria had survived Washington 
v. Davis as being a means of determining whether the at-large 
plan was being maintained for a discriminatory purpose: "Whether 
the pla.n is recent or remote, the Zinuner criteria provide a 
factual basis from which the necessary intent may be inferred." 
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F2d at 223. The net effect of this exercise 
in semantics therefore was that despite the "discriminatory 
impact" basis of the Zimmer criteria, the Court of Appeals has 
held that they have survived the intentional discrimination 
rationale of ~~shington v. Davis, and that really Washington v. 
Davis has not changed anything. In this case, the district judge 
observed that "Functionally, this added requirement has not 
changed the district court's task since 'a finding of racially 
discriminatory dilution under the Zimmer criteria raises an 
inference of intent and, therefore. • • a finding under the 
criteria satisfies the intent requirement ••• '" (Findings, 
pp. 4-5). 
15. 
The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
in dilution cases, followed by the district court below, 
therefore arecontrary to Washington v. Davis, supra, and the 
other cases cited above in paragraph 12. 
16. 
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the district 
court below by applying the Zimmer criteria, the evidence below 
without dispute shows that the at-large system had not been 
maintained for a discriminatory purpose. What the evidence 
does show is that in fact the question of county-wide versus 
district voting has never been an issue or even discussed in 
Burke County prior to the filing of this case in 1976. Conse-
quently, there is direct evidence that the county-wide system 
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was not maintained for a discriminatory purpose, and therefore, 
the so-·called Zimmer criteria (485 F2d 1297) , a species of cir-
cumstantial evidence giving rise to an inference that county-
wide voting was being maintained for discriminatory purposes, 
could have no application whatever to this case. 
17. 
The recent action of this Court on October 2, 1978, 
in noting probable jurisdiction in City of Mobile, Alabama v. 
Bolden,_ No. I 7-1844 (S.C., 571 F2d 238), 47 U. S. Law Week 
3221, furthe r i ndicates the unsettled and evolving nature of the 
law in this ar ea, for some of the questions presented for 
decision in that case are whether the decisions of't.l"e'Court:o:e.JlPpe.al 
in this area are in conflict with principles established in 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), Washington v. Davis, 
426 u.s. 229 (1976), and other cases, and whether the Constitu-
tion authorizes a federal court to legislate an entirely new 
form of government for a city "for no purpose except that of 
guaranteeing that black citizens ••• will be elected to city 
offices." 47 u.s. Law Week 3190-1. 
18. 
According to the Census of 1970, the population of 
Burke County is 18,255, of which 10,988, or 60.19% are black. 
Blacks constitute 53.56% of the voting age population, and 38% 
of the registered voters. Since the evidence shows without 
dispute that blacks have had no difficulty registering or voting 
in Burke County, black citizens presently have it within their 
power to control elections on a county-wide basis. 
19. 
Because there is direct proof that county-wide voting 
was not originally instituted for a discriminatory purpose, and 
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that it has not been maintained for such a purpose, defendants 
show t't:.at the Zimmer criteria (485 F2d 1297, 1305) are not appli-
cable bere. However, even conceding the applicability of the 
Zimmer criteria to the facts of this case, the undisputed evi-
dence is that two of the factors do not exist at all. To begin 
with, county-wide voting in Burke County is rooted in a strong 
state policy divorced from discrimination, having been in effect 
in Burke County for 67 years, and in effect in at least eleven 
elective bodies in adjoining or nearby counties. 5 The district 
court below r Pcognized that this Zimmer issue was neutral 
(Findings, pp . 21-2). 
20. 
The evidence also requires the finding that blacks 
have equal access to the slating of candidates. The evidence 
shows that there is no formal slating of candidates in Burke 
County, and no powerful organizations or individuals through 
whom candidacies are customarily cleared. In order to run, .a 
person merely goes to party officials and pays the entrance 
fee. Black candidates have run, and have had no difficulty 
doing so. Also, the evidence showed that the blacks are better 
organized politically than the whites, in that there are two 
black organizations which conduct political meetings at which 
5. Jefferson County, Ga. Laws 1935, p. 713; Columbia County, 
Ga. Laws 1968, Vol. I, p. 2338 (county-wide voting for commis-
sioners running from districts); Taliaferro County, Ga. Laws 
1877, p. 269; Warren County, Ga. Laws 1877, p. 269; Lincoln 
County Board of Education, Ga. Laws 1953 Nov. Dec. Sess., 
p. 219; Lincoln County Commissioners, Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 
1228, 1230; Elbert County Commissioners, Ga. Laws 1962, 
Vol. II, p. 2319; Elbert County Board of Education, Ga. Laws 
1958 Vol. I, p. 717; McDuffie County Commissioners, Ga. Laws 
1964, Vol. 2, p. 2095; Oglethorpe County, Commissioners, Ga. 
Laws 1872, p. 453; Oglethorpe County, Board of Education, Ga. 
Laws 1966 Vol. I, p. 764. Also, of the fifty largest school 
boards in the United States, thirty-two use city-wide elec-
tions. See Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F2d 1, 2 (C.A. 1st 
1977). 
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candidates a:re invited to attend and speak , and at laas t one 
of these organizations publishes a ticket of approved candidates 
which is circulated at the polls. The findings of the district 
court below, while conceding that blacks have not been discrimi-. 
nated against with respect to voting or running for office 
(F indin~rs , p. 19) , attarpt.s to gloss over this fact, by embarking 
upon an inquiry which confuses this issue with the entirely 
separate ~mer factor relating to whether "past discrimination 
in general pr ecludes the effective participation in the election 
system. " (485 F2d at 1305). In other words, in order to 
support i ts finding, the Court below confuses analysis by 
holding that a finding on ~ Zimmer criteria also establishes 
another factor. See Findings, .pp. 19-21. 6 
21. 
Third, the overwhelming weight of the evidence shoWs 
that Burke County officials have been responsive to the par-
ticularized needs of blacks. Contrary to the finding below 
(p. 12), the evidence shows that blacks have been appointed 
to the Jury Collll\issioners, Board of Education, Voters Registra-
tion Board, Waynesboro-Burke County Recreation Commission, 
Department of Family and Children Services Board, Central 
Savannah River Area Board, and one black has been elected to 
the City Council in Waynesboro. With respect to road paving, 
the district court's findings disregard the undisputed evidence 
6. The emphasis placed by the Court below upon the role of the 
local Democratic Executive Committee is puzzling. The undisputed 
evidence below was to the effect that the Committee had little 
or nothing to do, most of the members had never attended a 
meeting, that anyone was free to run for the positions, wide-
spread public announcement of which was made before each pri-
mary, and there was no evidence whatever that the Committee had 
ever made a substituted nomination. As one member of the Commit-
tee testified, it functioned mainly in the past to conduct the 
primary election, and after that function was taken over in 
Georgia by the probate court and in Burke County by t he Election 
Board, the local committee now has little or nothing to do. 
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that there are 640 miles of unpaved roads in Burke County: 
defendants identified 14 unpaved roads on which the majority 
of citizens a re white, and with respect to the 20 unpaved 
roads pointed out by plaintiffs as being inhabitated mainly 
by blacks, de f endants showed that a number of them were not 
paved by the county commissioners at all, but by state autho-
rities as part of a patronage system for local citizens who 
had supported successful state-wide candidates. The reference 
to the Commissioners donating public funds to buy band uniforms 
for the private, all-white school (Findings, p. 15) is incorrect. 
The Commissioners once contributed funds to purchase band uni-
forms for the public schools, but on a later occasion declined 
to do so again on advice of the county attorney. The Court's 
finding below that 3 additional registration sites provided 
by the commissioners were not added until after "friendly 
persuasion" by the Court at a pretrial conference (Findings, 
p. 14), is not correct. These sites were approved on February 
10, 1976 (D.Exh. 4), and the present case was not even filed 
until April 5, 1976, and it was several months thereafter before 
any pretrial hearing was held before the Court, probably after 
the election had been held. The Court's reference to the fact 
that there are 2 schools in the county that are still segregated 
(Findings, p. 9), also neglects to explain that this is because 
of an order entered by this same federal court for the Southern 
District of Georgia, (D. Exh. 55), permitting students who are 
in the minority to transfer to another school in the system where 
they ar e also in the minority. The two schools in question were 
small, isolated schools located in predominantly black areas, 
and although the public schools in Burke County were ooly 28.8% whit 
before any desegregation took place, the white percentage was 
reduced to only 19% during desegregation and has now increased 
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to 22%, meaning that there has been less resistance to school 
desegregation in Burke County than in Washington, D. c., Newark, 
New Jersey, and any other Northern cities. Moreover, ·Applicants 
submit that there is no basis in the Constitution for a federal 
court to adjudicate constitutional issues on the basis of whether 
or not , in its opinion, the governing body of a political sub-
division of a state has been responsive to the particularized 
interests~fany segment of the population. In this case, there 
was launched an investigation into every resolution or other 
action taken hy the governing body of Burke County during the 
last 2 5 year ·"' . Such an inquiry places the federal courts in 
the position of rewarding or punishing political subdivisions of 
a state depending upon whether or not the federal court approves 
or disapproves of the political philosophies of the governing 
bodies of those subdivisions as reflected by their legislative 
enactments. These are political questions, pure and simple, 
for which judicially-manageable standards simply do not exist. 
22. 
The finding of the Court below that there is a history 
of past discrimination in Burke County (Findings, pp. 6-11) 
misses the point. Certainly, there has been discrimination in 
Burke County in the past with respect to school segregation, 
as well as segregation in other areas. However, this case 
deals with voting, and there is no evidence whatever that during 
the last 30 years, there has been any discrimination either in 
registering or voting by blacks in Burke County. Every plaintiff 
and every plaintiffs' witness who testified, testified that 
they had always been able to register and vote without difficulty. 
While a literacy test was enforced until passage of the Voting 
Rights Act, that test was constitutional, Lassiter v. Northam to 
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Electi~n Board, 360 u.s. 45, 51-2 (1960), and the undisputed 
testimony in this case is that very few, if any, blacks were 
ever denied registration in Burke County because of their 
inability to successfully complete this test. To the contrary, 
the undisputed testimony was that blacks had been treated 
fairly in t he r egistration process. The Court's finding that 
the sudden increase in registration following enactment of 
the Voting Rights Act is merely a conclusion without any facts 
to support it. To begin with, the 41.8% black registration is 
incorrect, and plaintiffs and defendants both agreed that this 
figure, although included in discovery documents but never ad-
mitted in evidence, was based upon errors in tabulation. The 
segregated laundromat referred to by the Court (Findings, 
• 
p. 11), was an isolated instance which was not even known to 
any of the defendants until this trial. More to the point, 
however, there was no evidence whatever that the past segrega-
tion in education or in other facilities, operated in the least 
during the present to prevent blacks from voting or registering 
to vote, and that, and not segregated schools or other facilities, 
is the touchstone of this litigation. 
23. 
Defendants further show that the doctrine of dilution 
relied on in this case has no applicability to the districting 
plans of county and municipally elected bodies. Wise v. Li scomb, 
57 L.Ed.2d 411, 423 (1978) (concurring opinion of 4 justicies). 
24. 
The decision of the Court below is also erroneous as a 
matter of law in that in the unnecessary haste to reach a 
decision before the 1978 November election, the district court 
rendered final judgment before first making the detailed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law required by the decisions of the · 
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Court of Appeals. Nevett v. Sides, 533 F2d 1361 (C.A. 5th 1976); 
David v. Garriso~, 553 F2d 923 (C.A. 5th 1977); Blacks United 
For Lasting Leadership v. Shreveport, 571 F2d 248 (C.A. 5th 
1978). 
25. 
The Court's order below also is erroneous for the · 
reason that a districting plan can no longer be held invalid 
~imply because of a history of past discrimination. McGill v. 
Gadsden County Commission, 535 F2d 277 (C.A. 5th 1976), dis~ 
approving a contrary holding in Wallace v. House, 515 F2d 619 
(C.A. 5th 1975), vacated and remanded 425 u.s. 947 (1976). Even 
so, in this case the evidence of past discrimination related to 
such things as segregated schools, and not discrimination in the 
denial of voting or registering. 
26. 
The Court's order below is erroneous for the reason 
that it violates the principle that the Court should not mandate 
a court-ordered plan without first affording local officials 
an opportunity to devise their own plan, Wise v. Lipscomb, supra, 
and submit it under Section 5. Berry v. Doles, U.S. , 
57 L.Ed.2d 693 (1978). 
27. 
Applicants show that because there is a delay of 
over a year in getting transcripts typed up in the Southern 
District of Georgia, and a delay of 1 to2 years in deciding 
cases in the Fifth Circuit, it is impossible for the case to 
reach this Court until after the persons elected in November 
take office, and doubtful that the case can even reach this 
Court until after the regularly scheduled elections in 1980 
take place. The end effect may therefore be that the case will 
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become moot before the decision below is ever reviewed on the 
merits, for regardless of whether black or white candidates 
are elected in November 1978 or November 1980, those candidates 
will have answered to a small, single district constituency, 
and cognizant thereof, may and likely will direct that the 
pending appeal be dismissed, notwithstanding the fact that 
heretofore there has been no agitation in Burke County for 
district voting . Consequently, the order of the Court below 
contains bui t- i n means for insuring that its correctness will 
never be cons idered, with the end result being that a state 
law will have been struck down and the political structure of 
the county altered by the exercise of federal judicial power 
which was erroneous when made but practically immune to review. 
28. 
A stay therefore should be granted because: 
(1) The importance and novelty of the issue presented 
as to the effect of the requirement of a showing of intentional 
discrimination in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment ·cases, and 
its effect upon the "discriminatory impact" rationale of the 
Zimmer criteria. See International Boxing Club v. United States, 
2 L.Ed.2d 15 (1957). 
(2) The importance and novelty of the issue as to 
whether the dilution doctrine of White v. Regester, 412 u.s. 
755, 765 (1973), applies to county or municipal governments. 
See Wise v. Lipscomb, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978) - opinion of Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, 
and Mr . Justice Powell. 
(3) The drastic character of the judgment below -
striking down a law which has been in effect for 67 years, and 
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which the Court below found was not enacted for a discriminatory 
purpose , and in effect ordering a redistricting of county 
government under a plan deliberately gerrymandered to insure 
election of two black commissioners by creation of two districts 
over 70% black. International Boxing Club v. United States_, 
supra. 
(4) The ordering in effect of a plan proposed by 
plaintiffs which on its face is calculated to dilute white 
voting strength by placing 3 of the incumbent commissioners in 
one district, while being careful to place two of the plaintiff-
candidates in the separate, predominantly black districts. 
(5) The pendency of somewhat similar questions in 
the Mobile case (No. 77-1844, 47 Law Week 3221) now before this 
Court. See Yasa v. Esperdy, 4 L.Ed.2d 1717 (1960). 
(6) The existence of substantial reasons to believe 
that the findings made below will be held to be clearly erroneous 
so that applicants might then prevail. Board of Education v. 
Taylor, 82 S.Ct. 10 (Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan). 
(7) The likelihood that four members of this Court 
will vote to grant review. Appalachian Power Co. v. American 
Institute of C.P.A., 4 L.Ed.2d 30, 32 (1959) (Opinion of Mr. 
Justice Brennan); City of Boston v. Anderson, 47 L.W. 3277 
(October 24, 1978- Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan). See Wise 
v. Lipscomb, supra, where 4 Justices of this Court recently 
posed the question as to whether the dilution doctrine even 
applied to the political subdivisions of a state. 
(8) The irreparable injury likely to be inflicted 
upon applicants should the stay be denied and the decision 
below ultimately determined to be incorrect in some other 
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case. (See Par. No. 27, supra). On the other hand, there is 
no such prospect of irreparable injury being inflicted on 
plaintiffs even assuming the judgment below is held to be 
correct on appeal. At most, an election would be held in the 
same manner that they have been held for 67 years, in which 
the undisp ted evidence shows that blacks are free to vote, 
without hindrance, and with the present capability to control 
the outcome. The balance of equities clearly preponderates in 
favor of applicants. City of Boston· v. Anderson, 47 L.W. 3277 
(Oct. 24, 1978, Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan). 
WHEREFORE, Applicants pray that a stay be granted 
of the district court's order and judgment, pending appeal. 
P. o. Box 88 
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 
P. o. Box 896 
Elberton, Georgia 30635 
PRESTON B. LEWIS 
LEWIS & LEWIS 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia --- --
Before THORNBERRY; ·GODBOLD and RUBIN, Circuit Judges. 
BY THE COURT: 
I 
IT IS ORDERED that appellants' motion for stay pending appeal 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
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HERMAN LODGE, SHELLY 
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K. C. CHILDERS, REV. 
DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE 
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY, 
and LEVI CRAWFORD, 
individually and on 




J. F. ~UXTON, QU I NTON 
ROGERS, ~OY MARCHMAN and 
RAY HARPER, individually 
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THOMPSON, Individually * 
and in their official 
capacities as members * 
of the Board of Elections 
for Burke County, Georgia, * 
and RAY DeLAIGLE, 
Individually and in his 
official capacity as a 
member· of the Board of 
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Following a ' bench trial lasting several days in this 
voting dilution case, the Court has come to the conclusion: 
1. that the plaintiffs are entitled to prevail, 
2. that the present members of the Board of Commissioners 
for Burke County have been elected in an unconstitutional 
election and shall be replaced by new commissioners elected 
in accordance with the election provided herein, 
3. that Burke County shall be divided into five districts, 
in accordance with the map designed as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No~ 300, 
EXHIBIT "A" 
, ..... -.... ,, ...... ,. .. 
.. 
4. t hat the duly qualified voters of each such .district 
shall elect one of its r esidents otherwise qualified by Georgia 
law who may or may not be freeholders of such district as one 
of the County Commissioners of Burke County for the five-member 
commission, 
5. that defendants shall open and accept qualifications 
for candidates for said p9sitions commencing immediately and 
until 12:00 o'clock noon, October 16, 1978, (the qualifying 
fee shall 'be the same as· otherwise provided by Georgia law in 
special elections for such positions), and 
6. that the election for said new commissioners shall 
be held at the same time as the General Election to ·be held 
in 1978 for the 0lection of the Governor of the State and· 
the members of the United States Congress fr6m ~eorgia. 
The individuals elected as Commissioners of Burke County 
pursuant to this Order shall serve for a period of two years, 
after which their successors shall be elected in 1980 for 
four-year terms, as otherwise provided by law. 
This Order will presently be supplemented and support~d 
by the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. The Court, because of other pressing business, has 
been unable to place its findings and conclusions in proper 
final form. Accordingly, the Court deemed it imperative to 
enter the instant Order so that the maximum amount of time 
could be accorded the candidates to prepare for the election 
ordered herein. 
The parties are directed to cooperate in technical 
aspects of holding said election so as to eliminate any un-
necessary problems therein. 
11-
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'FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This action for declaratory judgment was tried by the 
Court without a jury. The named plaintiffs and other black 
1 
residents of Burke County, Georgia, brought this action to 
challenge the existing method of selecting their five county 
1 
This action was certified 
Court's Order of May 12, 1977. 
"of all black citizens of Burke 
EXHXBIT "B" 
as a class action by the 
The certified class consists 
County, Georgia." 
: • • •• :; : • • ,..~~ ... : . ... - ... ~' •• •• l;;• " • • .. 
,, .• u-a.,.,,,,,, •. , .. , 
•••·C 
2 
commissioners, charging the method unlawfully diluted the 
strength of their votes. Plaintiffs pray that the County 
be· divided into single-member districts in order to eliminate 
the conditions producing the unlawful dilution. For the 
reasons that are set out below, the Court finds for the 
plaintiffs. 
According to plaintiffs, Blacks are not and cannot be 
elected to the County Commission, or generally to other elected 
positions, because the "at-large~ system in use minimizes and 
dilutes black voting strength. No Black has ever been elected 
!' 
to the County Commission, in spite of the fact that historically 
2 
The Board of Commissioners of Burke County, as presently 
constituted, derives from Georgia Laws of 1911, p. 390. Ac-
cording to Section 1 of that Act, the Board of Commissioners 
of Roads and Revenues for Burke County consisted of five persons 
elected by the qualified voters of the county, all to be elected 
at the same time. Candidates were required to be resident 
freeholders of the county for at least three years prior to 
the election and, in addition, had to attain at least 28 years 
. of . age and be eligible to election as a member of the General 
Assembly of the State. 
The 1911 law was amended in 1929 by Georgia Laws of 1929, 
p. 548, to provide that the members of the County Commission 
be appointed by the Grand Jury of Burke County. 
This law was in turn amended by Georgia Laws of 1931, p. 
400, providing agaih that the county commissioners be elected 
by the qualified voters of the County. That Act requires 
that any candidate be· a · resident freeholder of the county for 
at least three years prior to election, and that property 
ownership requirement has been continued in the law to this 
date. 
All five county commissioners in Burke County are elected 
at the same time and for terms of four years, so that there 
are County Commission elections only once every four years. 
A majority vote is required for the nomination and election 
of any county cornmi~sioner, and county commissioners must run, 
both in primary and general elections for specific numbered 
posts. Neither of these practices was implemented in Burke 
County until they were imposed by general s~ate law in 1964. 
Qa. Code Ann. SS 34-1015 and 1513. (Defendants• Answer, • 9). 
The next regularly scheduled election for county commis-
sioners in Burke County is November, 1980, with primaries to 
be held several months prior thereto. 
No residency requirements, or subdistrict requirement 
exists for the election of individuals to the Burke County 
Commission. 
, ...... - .... ,, ..•.. ,. .. 
• 
Burke COUI 1ty hc\S more Bhtcks than Wl:li tes. 
defendants are quick to point out, 
3 
However, as 
"[t]he Constitution does not demand that each 
cogn :l :~eable element of a constituency elect 
repr~sentatives in proportion to its voting 
·strength. Even consistent defeat of a group's 
candidates, standing alone, does not cross 
constitutional bounds." (Citations omitted). 
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 1978) (hereinafter 
Nevett II). It i s the plaintiffs' burden to go beneath the 
surface and show t he Court, regardless of form, an unlawful 
voting dilution of constitutional dimensions "[b]y producing 
evidence to suppor1; findings that the political processes . 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group in question " Id. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the present method of 
nominating and electing the Board of Commissioners of Roads 
and Revenues for Burke County, including the use of numbered 
3 
The following is the population and percentage of popula-
tion by race in Burke County between 1930 and 1970 according to 
plaintiffs' exhibits 59, 108, 109.1 1101 and 191, of which the 




YEAR POPULATION WHITE BLACK --*c 
1975 101700 42% 58% 
1970 10,988 40% 60% 
1960 201596 34% 66% 
1950 23,458 29% 78% 
1940 261520 25% 75% 
1930 29,224 22% 78% 
*a 
Percentage is to the nearest whole percent. 
*b 
The "percentage white" figure includes a category labelled 
:foreign born white": the greatest number in this group was 421 
in 1930. After 1930, this statistic apparently was not kept. 
*c 
The 1975 figures are a mid-census estimate taken from 
plaintiffs' exhibit 191. 
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4 
posts, majority vote, run-offs and elections at-large, dilutes 
the relative . strength of their vote in violation of the rights 
guaranteed them by the f i rst, thirteenth, fourteenth, and 
fifteenth amendments of the Constitution. Plaintiffs also 
claim that Burke County's election system violated 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973, and 1983. 
Although plaintiffs assert a statutory theory of relief, 
the Court does not reach the issues raised by this theory, · 
only recently di s cussed in special concurrence by Judge Wisdom, 
in Nevett II, 57 1 ~.2d at 231. Since the Fifth Circuit has 
not addressed this theory in an operative context, and since 
plaintiffs have presented a strong case with respect to the 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the Court follows the 
test enunciated in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th 
Cir. 1973), en bane, aff'd sub~; ~ast Carroll Parish 
School Board v. Marshall, 424 u.s. 636 (1976) and Kirksey v • 
. Board of Supervisors .of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) 
·(~bane), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3354 (1977); recently 
described in United States v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest 
County, 571 F.2d 951, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1978), as a "multi-step 
inquiry." 
Before describing and undertaking the "multi-step inquiry," 
the Court notes that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
. decided in Nevett II that II • • [a demonstration of intention) 
• • • is necessary under both fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments," as a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote 
dilution. Nevett II, .571 F.2d at 221.1 Functional.ly, this 
added requirement has not changed the district court's task 
4 
Of course, multi-member districts, or county-wide 
elections systems are not per !! unconstitutional. . Fortson 
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
-4-
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since "a fj .nding of racially discriminatory dilution under 
the Zimmer criteria raises an inference of intent and, 
therefore, . • . a finding under the criteria satisfies the 
intent requirement. • " Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 217. 
As stated above, "Zimmer and Kirksey have established a 
multi-step inquiry for determining whether a districting plan 
[or election system) unlawfully dilutes a minority's parti-
cipation in the political process. The testing seeks to 
determine whether the plan either is a racially motiv.ated 
gerrymander or per petuates an existent denial of access to. 
the political process." United States v. Board of Supervisors. 
of Forrest County, 571 F.2d 951, 953 (S.D. Miss. 1978). 
J There is no question of a racial gerrymander involved here; 
rather, the question is whether the system perpetuates an 
existent denial of access to the poli ti·cal process. This 
question requires "that the court first investigate _whether 
· the minority community is pre~ently denied access to the 
political process. Zimmer enumerates several tests to guide 
this investigation." United States v. Board of Supervisors 
of Forrest County, 571 F.2d at 953. 
"The court in Zimmer established two 
categories [of factors), · one containing criteria 
going primarlly to the issue of denial of access 
or dilution, the other containing inquiries as 
to the existence of certain structural voting 
deyices that may enhance the underlying dilution. 
The 'primary' factors include: the group's ac-
cessibility to political processes (such as the 
slating of candidates), the responsiveness of 
representatives to the 'particularized interests' 
of the group, the weight of the state policy behind 
at-large dist~icting, and the effect of past dis-
crimination upon the group's participation in the 
election system. 485 F.2d at 1305. The 'enhancing' 
factors include: the size of the districti the 
portion of the vote necessary for election (majority 
or plurality); where the positions are not con-
tested for individually, the number of candidates for 
which an elector must votei and whether candi.dates 
must reside in subdistricts." 
Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 217. 
-5-
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It must be~ remembered that the Court is not limited in 
its determination only to the Zimmer factors, rather the 
Court may consider the Zimmer factors, "or similar ones." 
Kirksey v~ Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 
at 143. One "similar factor" considered in Kirksey 
which did not seem to be an explicit prim~ry factor in the 
Zimmer formula, is a depressed socio-economic status, 
"which makes participation in community proces~es difficult." , 
Id. This i s a n i mportant factor and it must be considered 
here. 
Finally, i n order to succeed, plaintiffs need not demon-
strate the existence of each of the primary factors, rather 
"[b]y proof of an aggregation of at least 
some of these factors, or similar ones, a 
plaintiff can demonstrate that .the members 
of the particular group in question are being 
' denied access." 
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139~ 
143 (S.D. Miss, 1977). 
' · 
The Court will discuss the primary factors in Part I, 
enhancing factors in Part II, conclusion in Part III, and 
relief in Part IV. 
I. 
A. 
HISTORY OF PAST DISCRIMINATION 
The history of•past discrimination is included as a 
factor in the dilution equation because the legacy of past 
discrimination may preclude a minority .group's effective 
parti9ipation in the political process. The Court finds 
.· plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence of past discri-




such effective participation. Moreover, it is evident that 
the present scheme of electing county commissioners, although 
racially neutral when adopted, is being maintained for in-
vidious purposes . Compare Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 
238 (5th Cir. 1978 ). 
The first f ac t which plaintiffs have established de-
monstrating this element of the Zimmer-Kirksey recipe is a 
link between past discrimination and low black voter registra-
tion. Before enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Black 
.suffrage in Burke c;ounty was virtually non-existent. As of 
December 19, 1962 only 427, or 6.5% of the eligible Blacks 
5 
were even registered. Following the Act's passage and by 
August 31, 1967, Black voter registration increased to 2,760 
or 41.8% of the eligible Blacks. Today, approximately 38% 
6 
of the eligible Blacks are registered to vote in Burke County • . 
The marked increase in the registration of Blacks following the 
enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act clearly indicates that 
· past discrimination has had an adverse effect on Black voter 
registration which lingers to this date. 
There was a clear evidence of bloc voting the only. 
time Blacks ran for · County Commissioner. Obviously, this must 
be ascribed in part ~o past discrimination. There are three 
5 
Plaintiffs' Reques~·of Judicial Notice . £1led February 16, 
1977~ Exhibit "E" • 
• 
6 
Plaintiffs claim the respective percentages of registered 
eligible voters are 3a% Black and 62% White, ·while defendants 
claim there are 44% Black and 56% White. Either set of figures 
· supports the Court's conclusion. Although there was some dispute 
·about these figures, neither party challenged the 1970 census 
. report on which the County Commission Election District Plan 
selected by the Court is based. 
-7-
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Militia Districts in which Blacks are in a clear majority, 
7 
the 66th, 72d and 74th. In a fourth district, the 69th, as 
of 1978, there were only a few more Blacks than Whites. One 
black candidate, ~1r. Childers, won in the four black districts, 
losing in all of the others. The other black candidate, Mr. 
Reynolds, won in three of the black districts losing in all of 
8 
the others. 
Similarl y , i n 1970 Dr. John Palmer, a white physician 
:-
from Waynewbor o , who opened the first integrated waiting room 
in Burke County , r an for County Commissioner. Generally, he 
was thought of a s being sympathetic to black political interests. 
He was soundly defeated. 
7 
The Court finds the following to be a reasonably accurate · 
estimate of the registered voters by race in each district, as 
of 1978. 
Precinct Black White Total 
Waynesboro 60-62 District 1,050 2,149 3,199 
Munnerlyn 6lst District 44 so 94 
Alexander 63rd ·District 75 104 179 
Sardis 64th District 211 478 689 
Keysville 65th District 163 214 377 
Shell Bluff - 66th District 167 82 249 
Greenscutt 67th District 49 215 264 
Girar-d 68th District 110 195 305 
St. Clair 69th District 29 26 55 
Vidette 7lst District 52 112 164 
Gough 72d District 201 68 269 
Midville 73rd District 184 195 379 
Scotts Store 74th• District 98 52 150 
Total 2,433 3,940 6,373 
8 
Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, filed June 5, 1978, 
. Exhibits I-3 and I-4. 
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In the recent city Gouncil election in Waynesboro, the 
counti sea t, a Black was elected to the council for the first 
time in h i story. This event can be attributed to the high 
degree of bloc voting, and to the fact that the elected Black 
9 
ran in a distr i ct with a high percentage of black residents . 
Past discrimination in education has also precluded 
effective black political participation. Burke County schools 
discriminated a ga i nst Blacks as recently as 1968. Bennet v. 
Evans, Civil No . 1369 (S.D. Ga), Order entered June 20, 1969. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 59. And there are still schools like Gough 
Elementary and Girard Elementary that remain essentially segre-
gated. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 233. Moreover, the Court finds that, 
as a group, Burke County Blacks have completed less formal 
education than Whites. Of the 4,476 black inhabitants of the 
County over 25 years of age, 346 (7.7%) never attended high 
school, 247 (5.5%) finished high school, and 123 (2.7%) finished 
college; while of the 4,281 white residents of the same ·age, 
·83 (1.9%) never attended school, 661 (15.2%) finished high 
10 
school, and 308 (7.1%) finished college. Based on the testi-
mony of the experts, one reason Blacks, as a group, have been 
ineffective in the political process, is the fact that they 
have completed less formal education. The Court concludes . 
that this condition is a direct result of the history of in-
vidious discrimination in Burke County. 
Past discrmination has also directly chilled the opportunity 
for Blacks' becoming involved in the Democratic Party Primary. 
The Court notes it was not until 1946 that the "white primary" • 
was struck down in Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946). The Court also finds past 
9 
This was possible because this Court created single-member 
districts. See Sullivan v. DeLoach, Civil No. 176-238 (S.D~ Ga.) 
Order entered September 11, 1977. 
10 
Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answer to Defendants' First 
Interrogatories, filed March 2, 1977, Exhibit "A". 
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discrimination has kept BJacks from becoming members of the 
B\,lrke Count:.y Democratic E>cecutive Conunittee. It was not 
until after this lawsuit ~;as filed that the Executive Committee, 
which conducts the only party primary in the county, gained· a 
Black as one of its twenty-four members. 
The Court finds evidence of present discrimination un-
fairly precluding Blacks from effective political participation 
in the requirements established by Ga. Code Ann. § 34-605, 
which states in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be 
eligible to serve as chief registrar unless such person owns 
interest in · re ~ l property ••• " A reference to Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 66-69 makes it readily apparent that significantly 
fewer Blacks than Whites are freeholders. The Court finds 
this is in part due to past discrimination, thus buttressing 
the Court's conclusion that Blacks are being unfairly pre-
eluded from participating in the political process. 
·Moreover, Burke County Blacks were compelled to turn 
to this Court to eliminate the existing racially discriminatory 
system of selecting Grand Jurors. See Sapp v. ·Rowland, Civil 
No. 176-94 (S.D. Ga.) Order entered May 20, 1977. 
Without specifically reiterating the statistics on hiring, 
the Court finds that as a result of the lingering effects of 
past discrimination, the County's hiring pattern has been 
carried out in a manner detrimental to the black community, 
particularly when one compares the number of Blacks hired to 
the number of Whites, or the salaries and positions they 
11 
respectively hold. The Court also notes that many of the 
• 
Blacks employed by the county are not in fact paid by the 
county, but from federal fundings. 
11 
Plaintiffs' R~quest for Admissions, filed June 5, 1978, 
Exhibit I-1. Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interro-
gatories filed June 14, 1976, Exhibit "C". 
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The Court finds that the effects of past discrimination has 
been a dirE~ct influence on the County Commissioners' failure 
to appoint more Blacks to the various committees and boards 
which oversee, or direct the execution of the county government. 
Without enumerating such committees and boards and the · related 
statistics, the Court points to one symbolic example of the 
Commissioners' attitude in.this respect. In appointing persons 
to serve on the Bi-Centennial Committee, the Commissioners 
12 
appointed four t e e n Whites and one Black. 
The Court a lsq takes · notice of Georgia laws demonstra.ting 
. 13 
a discriminatory i ntent. See generally Plaintiffs' Supple-
rnentary Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories, filed 
June 25, 1976, Answer 1, for a history of racial discrimination 
in Georgia. 
The Court also finds discrimination present in the form 
of a segregated laundromat's being operated within a few blocks 
14 
of the· county.courthouse. 
The Court concludes, based on the evidence discussed above, 
plaintiffs have demonstrated ample evidence of present effects 
of past discrimination for . the purpose of establishing this 
element of. the Zimmer-Kirksey test. 
B. 
UNRESPONSIVENESS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS 
Unresponsiveness to the needs . of Burke County . Blacks "may 
be proved by present evidence and by lingering effects of past 
• 
12 
Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories, 
filed June 14, 1976. 
13 . 
Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First 
Interrogator.ies, filed June 25, 1976, Answer 1. 
14 




discrimination." United States v. Board of Supervisors of 
F.orrest County, 571 F.2d 951, 954-55 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(quoting f r om Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 144-45). 
While the County Co~nissioners have taken advantage of 
most federally funded programs which were designed to meet 
the needs of the disenfranchised, · the Court finds the County 
Cornmissiom~rs, as an elected body, have acted with an insensi-
tivity to the particularized needs of the black community 
amounting t o unresponsiveness. For instance, "lingering 
effects of past discrimination" still haunt the county court-
:-
house; there is a "Nigger-hook" at the water fountain, and 
the toilet signs f or "Coloreds" and "Whites" still appear 
through faded pa int . 
One of the important functions of the County Commissioners 
is to appoint people to the various boards and committees which 
oversee execution of the county government. See Section A 
above. Although Blacks may not be entitled to be represented 
on the boards or committees in proportion to their frequency in 
the general population, the rare appointment of Blacks amounts 
to nothing more than a token afterthought, or simply to meet 
federal guidelines. It is the Court's impression that Blacks 
of Burke County desir~, and desperately need~ to play a mean-
ingful role in their local government; to be able to work within 
the system, rather than to be forced to attack it from without. 
The Commissioners have been singularly unresponsive to this 
need. This is particularly evident when one considers the 
racially unbalanced committee appointments. It is highlighted 
• 
by the fact that Blacks are just beginning to break into the 
ranks of committees whose function is to oversee agencies of 
-the county government that work principally with Blacks. As 
an example, it was not until recently that a Black was appointed 
to the committee overseeing the Department of Family and Children 
Services. The Commissioners' continued failure to view problems 
-12-
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with racial impartiality as well as their unresponsiveness is 
shown by the procedures used to select the Judge for the Burke 
County Small Claims Court. That court was created at the re-
quest of t he small, local merchants, the majority of whom are 
. White, to collect unpaiq consumer debts. The judge selection 
process is of note here .in that the Commissioners selected a 
committee to pick the Jud~e. However, they failed to appoint 
anyone to the committee who could fairly consider potential 
interests of defendants, most of whom are Black. The Court . 
finds that much in the same manner that the Commissioner's 
~ 
have been unresponsive in committee appointments, they have 
also been unresponsive in their hiring policies. Although the 
Commissioners do not hire everyone who works for the county, 
their policy sets the tenor for the county's hiring. As noted 
above in Section A, most Blacks hold lower paying jobs, and 
from the testimony, it appeared that the majority of· Blacks 
employed by the county were paid with federal money, whereas . 
white employees were usually paid from county funds. 
The Commissioners have also shown unresponsiveness in 
the paving of · county roads. Although the evidence in this 
regard was not presented with precision or complete clarity, 
the Court finds tha~ the Commissioners' paving decisions have 
exhibited a racially discriminatory pattern, thus demonstrating 
15 
unresponsiveness. In particular, the Court notes the follow-
ing: (1) The Mamie Jo Rhodes Subdivision, inhabited by Blacks, 
is unpaved. It is directly across from a subdivision inhabited 
by Whites. The latter has paved roads. (2) Millers Pond Road 
is paved up to the pond, used by Whites; but from that point 
the road is unpaved, although that portion is inhabited by 
Blacks. (3) Paving on Hatchett Road ends at the residence of 
15 
In the main, for its conclusion on this point, the Court 
relies on the te~timony of Messrs. Harvey, Hopper, Kitchens, 
Lodge, and Smith, in conjunction with Plaintiffs' Exhibit 279. 
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a White: yet Blacks live on the remaind~r of the unpaved 
road. (4) The streets of Alexander are paved in the section 
of town inhabited by Whiles: but the roads in the black section 
are not paved . And (5) county road 284 is paved to the point 
where the last · white lives, but beyond, where the road is 
inhabited by Black~ the road is unpaved. It is of interest 
16 
to note that the road to the dog trial field is paved even 
though trials are held bu~ once a year. By contrast, there is 
still an unpaved road to a school. Although the last unpaved 
road to a white school was paved in 1930, it seems as if the 
road to the Palmer~Elementary School, formerly an all-black 
school, and still predominatly black, remains unpaved. While 
the defendants point out instances where Whites were living· on 
unpaved roads, and that they had recently paved "Lodge Circle" 
of primary benefit to one of the named plaintiffs, the Court 
finds plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated defendants' 
17 
unresponsiveness in the form of their paving decisions. 
The Court finds that pnce Blacks have made their needs 
known, the sluggishness, . or bureaucratic "run-a-round" to 
which they · repeatedly have been subjected amounts to unresponsive-
ness. As a result, Blacks have been forced outside the local 
government for relief. They went .to the courts to seek school 
and Grand Jury integration (see Section A above), and to the 
streets to "agitate," as defendants have said, to get lighting 
at the Davis Park ball . field. Outside pressure had to come to 
bear before the county budged. 
The county did, indeed, establish additional registration 
. 
sites. But only after a pre-trial conference before and 
"friendly persuasion" by this Court. ~he defendants' tepidity 
16 
Burke County is famous as a center for bird dog field 
· trials. 
17 
There was also testimony about "political roads," i.e., 
pork-barrel projects whereby the local state representative-could 
bequeath a road to a political friend. According to defendants' 
testimony, the County Commissioners had little control over these 
roads. However, the Court still finds such "political roads" in-
dicative of Blacks' lack of access to the system, since no witness 




was fure1er demonstrated by the fact that a period of four 
months was required to get the registration cards to the 
new sites ; and that the new sites were operative only a 
short whi le before the registration period ended. Admittedly, 
the County Commissioners recently approved a transportation 
system that should help solve access problems for some; but 
only after being prodded .by the prosecution of this lawsuit. 
The Commissioners' sluggishness in this respect is another 
example of their unresponsiveness to the black members of 
the community. ~ 
Another area in which the defendants have exhibited un-
responsivenes s has been in public educatiori. This manifest~d 
itself in the form of conflicts of interest, · if not outright 
breaches of the public trust. There was evidence· that in 
the early sixtie s , when desegregation of public schools was 
beginning to become an inevitable reality, the County Com-
. missioners showed their colors by .being among the ·incorporators 
of the all-white Edmund Burke Academy. ·There is more. The . 
Commissioners then donated public funds to buy band uniforms 
for the private school's band, despite advice to the contrary 
by the county attorney. 
The Court finds, based primarily on the defendants' 
continued failure to make Blacks a viable part of the county 
governmen~ that the Commissioneers, as a result of the lingering 
effects of past discrimination, have been unresponsive to plain-
tiffs' needs. The Court finds this factor must be inciuded as 
part of the aggregate of factors to be considered in determining 
the existence of vote dilution. 
The Court concludes that the insensitivity of defendants 
to the needs of the plaintiff class exists because of inviduous 
racial motivations. 
-15-
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c. 
DEPRESSED SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
One of the factors the Kirksey court identified as being 
indicative of denial of access to political process is "a 
depressed sotioeconomic status." Kirksey v. Board of 
Supervisors of Hinds Count~, 554 F~2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1977). 
The socio-economic status of Blacks in Burke County is 
18 
clearly depre s sed . According to Plaintiffs' Exhibits 66 
·and 67, of t he 1,731 families in Burke County with incomes 
below the poverty level, 1,467 were Black and 274 were White. 
Given that Blacks are 60% of the population, there are approxi-
mately 25% more Blacks whose income is at a poverty level than 
should be expected. The picture looks even worse when one 
notices that nearly 53% of black families had incomes three-
fourths, or less, of a poverty level income. The Court finds 
this is in part caused by past discrimination. 
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 u.s. 254 (1970), the Supreme 
Court stressed that the plaintiffs' lack of resources was one 
of the primary reasons for its holding. Admitted.ly, Goldberg 
was not a voting rights case, but the same careful consideration 
must be given by this Court to the factor of income because to 
more than half of the plaintiffs, the "need to concentrate 
upon finding the means for daily sustenance, in turn, adversely 
affects [their] ability to seek redress from • • • [the local) 
19 
bureaucracy." Goldberg, supra at 264. To this end, the oppor-
tunity to cast an undiluted vote becomes indispensable. Ac-
cordingly, the Court is constrained to find, within the context 
• 
18 
It appears that Burke County must be an undesirable 
place for Blacks considering the steady decrease in the county's 
black population. Between 1930 and 1970, Burke County's black 
population has decreased from 78% to 58% of the total population . 
. Moreover, 99% of Burke County's Blacks were born in Georgia, 
while 24% of Burke County's Whites were born out of state. This 
exodus is probably tied, in part, to past discrimination, and 
present economic inequality between the races. Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 59, 108, 109, 110, and 191. 
19 
The verity of this statement was supported by the testi-
mony of both experts. 
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of the Zilnmer-Kirksey aggregate test, that the economic plight 
of a substantial majority of plaintiffs is tied to past dis-
crimination, and is indicative of their lack of access to the 
political process. See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 · 
(1974). 
In addition to a depressed economic status, Blacks in 
Burke County are subject to a depressed social status. Although 
there is no single indicia which the social scientists have 
identified a s d~terminative of social status, some of the 
factors identified ,are present here. The first index to which 
the Court turns i s education. Education, or the lack thereof, 
is an indicator of social status, and according to the experts, 
would influence the likelihood of a minority group's effective 
participation in the political process. Objective statistics 
show that Blacks have completed less formal education than 
20 
Whites. It appears without serious dispute that what education 
Blacks did receive was qualitatively inferior to a marked degree. 
· Per capita spending for the education of black students was 
21 
much less than for their white counterpart. The Court finds 
that the unbroken history of an inferior formal education has 
had an does now have a strong tendency to preclude Blacks' 
effective participation in the political process. 
There is additional evidence which illustrates the fact 
that Blacks in Burke County have a depressed socio-economic 
status. When one examines Plaintiffs' Exhibits 64 and 65, he 
learns that Blacks tend to receive less pay for similar work, 
and that Blacks tend to have the more menial jobs. Housing for 
Blacks also tends to be inferior, according to Plaintiffs' 
20 
· Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First 
Interrog~tories, filed March 2, 1977, Exhibit "A". 
21 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 278. 
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Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories, 
filed June 25, 1976, Exhibit A. This exhibit depicts that 73% 
of the houses occupied by Blacks lacked some, or .all, plumbing 
facilities, whi l e only 16% of the houses occupied by Whites 
suffered the same shortcomings. 
The Court must conclude that, unfortunately, Blacks in 
Burke County suffer a depressed socio-economic status due in 
part to the lingering effects of past discrimination. 
D. 
LACK OF ACCESS TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
The political. process, in a voting dilution context, 
has received both a literal and a broad interpretation. It 
not only has been interpreted to mean physical access to the 
voting and election processes, i.e., "access of the individual 
to the ballot box or voting booth ••• " but also to include 
" whether a group has input into the political decision-
making process • II Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of 
~inds County, 554 F.2d 139, 143 n. 10. The Court finds that in 
the past, as well as in the present, plaintiffs . have been denied 
equal access to the political process. 
Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Acts of 1965, 
Blacks in Georgia were unfairly denied access to the election 
processes by such devices as literacy tests, poll taxes, and 
22 
white primaries. Plaintiffs tried to demonstrate that the 
Georgia "purge law" (Ga. Code~· S 34-624), was such a 
23 
device, and presently works an unfair denial of access on 
.·plaintiffs. The Court finds plaintiffs .have failed to prove 
22 
Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First 
· Interrogatories, filed June 25, 1976, Answer 1. 
23 
The 1976 Georgia Constitution still demands a literacy 
and ".good character and understanding" test as a requisite for 
voting, although this provision is suspended by the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act. 
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this theoJ~Y for their failure to demonstrate adequately 
that more Blacks than Whites are purged; or that a two-year 
period is unduly restrictive towards Blacks. The Court makes 
this finding even though plaintiffs have successfully shown 
that Blacks, by virtue of their relatively severe degree of 
poverty, i:he size of the county (Part II, Section A below), 
and the absence of a public transportation system, are more 
likely than Whites to have a problem physically getting to 
the polling p 2acl > where they may exercise their most fundamental 
of rights . 
' Although plaintiffs here were unable to show a denial 
of access to specific voting processes, similar to the ob-
viously eggregious denials in · Kirksey, i.e., disqualification 
I 
of certain black candidates by the county election commission, 
or a conditioning of primary participation upon a pledge of 
party loyalty, the Court finds a denial of access, in part, 
caused by the llngering effects .of past discrimination, in 
the virtual absence of Blacks.on the Democratic Executive 
Committee. .Defendants attempted to refute a potential finding 
of this nature by minimizing the role played by the Democratic 
Executive Committee in Burke C~unty politics. Defendants . 
pointed out that primary slating is open, and that the Exe-
cutive Committee has never actively supported a candidate. 
These facts, however., must be viewed in a proper context 
rather than in a vacuum. The context demonstrates that by 
state law, the committee may provide poll officers, ~· ~ 
~~· S 34-501; poll watchers, ~· ~ ~· S 34-1310(b); and, 
• 
substituted nominations, Ga ~ !na· S 34A-903. Election in 
• 
the primary is "tantamount" to election to the office. The 
Executive Committee elects and sends representatives to the 
various political conventions. The court concludes, therefore, 
contrary to defendants' urgings, that the Democratic Executive 
Committee does indeed play an important, albeit subtle, part 
in Burke County politics. 
-19-
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In addition to the tasks listed above, the Executive 
Committee is required by its national and state charters to 
24 
"insure full participation by all segments of society." 
The lingering effects of past discrimination are highlighted 
by the fact that in spite of these affirmative action 
requirements, when the Committee recently designed a sub-
district election scheme for the election of its twenty-four 
25 
members, no Blacks were asked for their input to the plan. 
The Court finds t he lingering effects of past discrimination to 
be an importan t c a use of a virtual "lilly-white" Democratic 
~ 
Executive Commi t tee. This fact must be· added into the sum 
producing the unfair exclusion of Blacks from the political 
process. 
The Court also finds that the effects of past discrimina-
tion exclude Blacks from the personal contact politics of 
Burke County. Many of defendants' witnesses testified that 
success in Burke County politics is based on the number of 
friends one has. Defendants' ·witnesses stated this was the 
case because Burke County has a small population, so that 
most of its inhabitants know each other on a personal level. 
As a result there is little need for debate at election time 
for the Whites who have for centuries dominated the public 
scene. As is further evidenced by testimony of these witnesses, 
if the voter personally knows . the candidate, he or she knows · 
the candidate's political stance. When this factor is combined 
wi.th the virtual segregation of all social, religious, and 
business organizations excepting that the only significant 
• 
24 
_ Article 9, Section 3, of Georgia Democratic Party State 
Charter. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 225. 
25 
. It is more than interesting to note that the former and 
.·present commission· members tes'tified t .hat the political division 
caused by a single-member district plan would create an unworkable 
County Commission. Yet, Mr. Thompson, himself, a former com-
missioner and Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee, 
admitted that even though the Executive Committee memberR were 
now elected by districts, this n~w system had not impaired the 









black-whi t~e relationships are on an. employee-employer basis, 
the result obtains that Blacks are shut out of the normal 
27 
course of politics in this tightly-knit rural county. 
This is no t to say, however, that it is the Court's opinion 
that meaningful political dialogue, which fosters responsive 
action, cannot develop between an employee and employer. 
Rather, the Court notes aAd finds that the combination of 
factors discussed above, all of which seem to be related to 
past discrimination, operate unfairly to exclude Blacks from 
26 
the normal course qi personal contact politics in Burke County. 
As a final factor to be ·considered in the Blacks' lack of 
meaningful input into the political process, the Court finds, 
as discussed above in Section B, that the Commissioners'. failure 
to appoint Bl acks t o the committees and boards in sufficient 
numbers, or a meaningful fashion, is without doubt an unfair 
denial of access o f input into the political process. 
While the denials of access in this case have not been 
· especially blatant, the Court finds in the circumstances of 
this rural, tightly-k.nit, racially-separate society, that 
such denials, subtle though they may be, have operated unfairly 
to keep Blacks from meaningful political input. 
E • . 
STATE POLICY BEHIND THE 
AT-LARGE ELECTION SYSTEM 
The Court adopts the reasoning of Chief Judge Edenfield 
in Pitts v. Busbee,•Governor, 395 F. Supp. 35, 39 (N.D. Ga. 1975), 
26 
Based on testimony and Plaintiffs' Exhibits 59-69, and in 
particular Exhibit 53. 
27 
This is especially true for poorer Blacks living in the 
more isolated areas of this large county. 
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remanded£~ other SFOunds, 536 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1976), with 
respect to the finding that this factor ·is neutral. 
But while neutral in origin, it has been subverted to 
invidious purposes. Since it is a statute of local appli-
cation, its enactment, maintenance or alteration is determined 
by the desires of representatives in the state legislature of 
the county af fec b >d. Burke Is representatives have always been 
Whites. Accord i nol y, they have retained a system which has 
minimized the ability of Burke County Blacks to participate 
in the political system. 
II. 
THE ENHANCING FACTORS 
It appears that the "enhancing" factors have become part 
of the dilution "equation" for at least two reasons. First, 
their existence is relatively easy to determine and, second, 
their effect on a minority group, though somewhat limited in 
comparison to the "primary" factors,· is obvious. 
As mentioned e~rlier, the Zimmer "enhancing" factors are: 
the size of the distr.ict; the portion of the vote necessary for 
election (majority or plurality); the number of candidates for 
which an elector must vote, where the positions are not con-
tested ·individually; and whether candidates must reside in 




Burke County is nearly two-thirds the size of Rhode 
. Island, comprising an area of approximately 832 square miles. 
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,,. •u-•. ' ." ·••• •. "" 
p I 
.. 
The raison d'etre of this lawsuit is the fact that the 
district is undivided in any way. That is, it is as large 
as it can be in a relative sense. The geographic size has 
made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places 
or to cornpaign for office. There was no evidence to show 
that other counties in Georgia which have recently adopted 
single-member districts compare pejoratively to the "at large" 
counties in the i r ability to function. On the contrary, there 
was testimony by defendants' witness, Mr. Thompson, that the 
districting requirement for election to the Democratic Exe-
cutive Committee has not impaired that organizations ' ability 
to function. 
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the size of 
the county tends to impair the access of Blacks in Burke 
County to the political process. 
B. 
MAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENT 
Defendants, in paragraph 9 of their answer filed April 4, 
1976, admit that by the original act, county commissioners 
are to run at-large, that the victor must be elected by a 
majority vote, Ga. Code Ann. S 34-1513, and that candidates 
run for specific seats, Ga. Code ~· S 34-1015. 
As has been fqund by Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2cS 1297 
at 1306 (5th cir. 1973),the majority vote requirement tends 
to submerge the will of the minority and to deny the minority's 
access .to the system. 
Thfs Court finds that Ga Code Ann. SS 34-1015 and 1513 .---







ANTI-SINGLE SHOT RULE 
As in Nevitt II, there is no anti-single shot voting 
provision. The candidates now run for numbered positions. 
However, this Court concludes, as did Judge Pointer in 
Nevitt II , that the numbe~ed position method has some of 
the same cons P-quences as an anti-single shot, multi-member 
contest because a cohesive political group, such as the Blacks 
here, is unable to concentrate on a single candidate. 
. ,. 
D. 
LACK OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT 
The present system has no residency requirement. All 
candidates could reside in Waynesboro, or in "lilly-white" 





The Court has considered each of the Zimmer-Kirksey primary 
and enhancing factors. It concludes that eight of the eleven 
factors are presen~, here, which were present in the' recent 
finding of dilution by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest County, 571 
F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1978), that is, factors numbered 1, 2, 3, 5, 
-24-




8, 10, and 11. Since this is a dil~tion case ~ounded 
upon "'an intensely local appraisal of the design and 
impact of the [at-large] district in the light of past 
and present reality, political and otherwise,'" Blacks 
United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 
571 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) [quoting from White v. 
Regester, 412 u.s. 755, 769-70 (W.O. Tex. 1973)], the Court 
follows the aggregate test of Zirnmer-Kirksey. 
The evidence on the lingering effects of past dis-
crimination, from t~e "Nigger-hooks" in the courthouse to 
the segregated laundermat, is clearly established. The 
direct effect of past discrimination on access to the 
political pr ocess i s demonstrated by bloc voting by the 
County's hir ing pr actices, and, to a greater extent, the 
County's committee and board appointment practices. The 
Court also finds past discrimination has played a part in 
: today~s Black low voter registration. Past discrimination 
has also unfairly affected the quantity and quality of the 
28 . 
Based on Kirkse¥ v. Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139 (5th 
Cir. 1977), the court 1n United States v. Forrest County, 571 
F.2d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1978), found the following evidence 
constituted a successful claim of voting dilution: 
1. no black had been elected to a county 
office; 
2. retention of the poll tax aa a requisite · 
to voting until 1966; 
3. retention of a liter•cy teat until 19661 
4. conditioning of primary participation 
upon a pledge of party loyalty; 
5. property requirements for candidates 
for supervisors, 
6. designation of the county for the use 
of federal voting registrars; 
7. disqualification of certain black candi-
dates by the county election comm~asion; 
8. effect of a lower socio-economic level 
upon the blacks' ability to participate; 
9. a high rate of bloc voting; 
10. various electoral mechanisms, 
11. lack of responsiveness to the needa of 
black residents. 
-25-
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education ·received by Burke County's Blacks in the same way 
it has affected their social status. In turn, their social 
status, as the experts stated, has had an adverse effect on 
their access to the political process. 
The Court concludes that defendants are heedless of the 
needs of the b l ack community, whether it be in. the Blacks' 
concern for the quality of .education or the quantity of paving • 
. The sluggishness with which the Commission moves in response 
to Black demands is well-nigh the equivalent of callous 
indifference to th~t class which has fallen heir to the evil 
of two centuries of discrimination. The Commissioners' lack 
of responsiveness is merely an extension of a culture which 
could view the vestiges of slavery with unseeing eyes. Such 
indifference attests to the Commissioners' realization of 
the Blacks' political impotence, both individually and col-
lectively. 
It is clear that Blacks in Burke County have a depressed 
· socio-economic status, due in part to past discrimination. The 
fact that a substantial majority of Blacks have incomes ·of 
three-fourths; or less than, a poverty level income is an 
important factor wi·th respect to access both to the machinery 
of the political processes, and to the social avenues of 
political access, each of which is moat important in this 
tightly-knit, rural county. 
As stated before, the Court finds Blacks have been overtly 
denied in~ut into the .. political process by the Commissioners' 
failure to appoint ~lacks to committees and boards in a 
meaningful fa·shion. While the above is the moat blatant and 
pervasive denial of access which plaintiffs established, the 
court finds another more subtle denial of access caused in 
. great part by past discrimination, and that is the proscription 
of black ·participation in the personal contact politics of Burke 
-26-




The only enhancing factor that the Court considers has 
a special bearing on the aggregate is the size of the district. 
The County i s large and can reasonably be divided into districts. 
But more importantly, the Court finds the size of the County, 
in conjunction with the fact that its residents are not con-
centrated in the county seat, has an adverse effect on many of 
the plaintiffs' access to the political process. 
In the aggregate, defendants' unresponsiveness is per-
!' 
petuating the effects of past discrimination against plaintiffs, 
a group in a depressed socio-economic status, who have unfairly 
been denied a role in the political destiny of Burke County. 
Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs have shown a violation 
of the rights guaranteed them by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. It is unnecessary to consider the complaints of 




In light of the Court's findings above, the Court orders, 
for purposes of electing the five County Commissioners for 
Burke County, that the County be divided into five districts 
as delineated in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300. 
Although various districting proposals were submitted, 
• 
the Court finds plaintiffs' original plan to be superior to 
the others, including the similar plan submitted by defendants, 
because the population deviation among the districts is sub-






4 •' 4 
The Court selects a five-district plan over a plan in 
which any member is elected at-large because no "special 
circumstances" [Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir. 
1976)], could be found which would justify such an exception 
in view of the testimony indicating ~he Chair has little 
added responsibility or authority in comparison 'to the other 
Commissioners. 
The Court ha s considered .defendants• request for a stay, 
but under the c irc~stances denied that request. There is. 
ample time to ove r come any administrative problems. The 
plan selected by the Court tracks existing Militia District 
lines to a great extent and should pose few problems in the 
conduct of the election. Moreover, on balance, the plaintiffs 
have the better of it. Further denial or postponement of 
the Blacks' right to participate fully and freely in the 
. so.ciety of Burke County is not ·properly justified. 
' · 
29 
The following statistics show the breakdown of population 
of the districts in' the plan selected by the Court as to race 
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The foregoing findings and conclusions supplellel'\t the 
Order heretofore entered by the Court directing the election 
. " ' of the five Co~issione~a for Burke 1tounty at the same time ' 
as the general ~ election, Tueaday, November 8, 1978. 
So Ordered, this J ... CJ 0, day of October, 1978 • 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.. ....... 
\ 
I hereby certify that I have, prior to filing, served 
copy of the foregoing Application for Stay upon Mr. David F . ,,. 
Walbert, 1210 First National Bank Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
and upon Mr. Robert W. Cullen, 322 Tenth Street, Augusta, 
Georgia 30 ' 02 , Attorneys for Respondents, by mail, duly addressed 
and • postag~ p paid • 
. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
QUENTIN ROGERS, et al ) 




HERMAN LODGE, et al ) OCTOBER TERM, 1978 
) 
Respondents ) 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON 
APPLICATION FOR STAY 
Applicants hereby request the opportunity of 
presenting oral argument on their application for stay. 
This October 30, 1978. 
P. o. Box 88 
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 
P. 0. Box 896 
Elberton, Georgia 30635 
PRESTON B. LEWIS 
LEWIS & LEWIS 
HEARD, LEVERETT & ADAMS 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS 
RECEIVED 
HOV i 1973 
OFFICE OF' THE CL.ERv . 
SUPR£M£ COURT, U.s.' 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have, prior to filing, served 
copy of the foregoing Request for Oral Argument on Application 
for Stay upon Mr. David F. Walbert, 1210 First National Bank 
Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, and upon Mr. Robert W. Cullen, 
322 Tenth Street, Augusta, Georgia 30902, Attorneys for 
Respondents, by mail, duly addressed and postage prepaid. 
This October 30, 1978. 
( 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
RECEIVED 
r~: C'/ 3 1978 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
QUENTIN ROGERS, et al ) OCTOBER TERM, 1978. 
) 
Applicants ) APRLICATION FOR .STAY 
) #A 417 
VS: ) C.A. #176-55-U.S. DISTRICT 
) COURT AND #78-3241 
HERMAN LODGE, et al ) 
) U.S. ·coURT OF APPEALS FOR 
Respondents ) THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
) 
REPLY BRIEF ON BEAALF OF APPLICANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR STAY 
Several factual statements in respondents' brief in opposition 
require refutation. 
Enhancing Factors. At Page 5, respondents state that all four 
enhanci_ng factors have been found to exist here. This is not correct. 
Burke County does not constitute ·a large district, having only approxi-
mately 10,000 persons of voting ~ge. Nor does Georgia Law contain an 
anti-single shot voting provision~ 
State Policies Favoring County~Wide Elections. Also, at Page 5, 
respondents state that the policies favoring county-wide elections arose 
only after passage .of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and also were 
designed to prevent blacks from -voting_ .. There is no evidence supporti~:~,.. ~~ 
this contention. County-wide voting has been in effect in Burke Count; 1\ 
1 · --\~ 
. . . •1. 
as in many counties for many years. It is true that after Baker v. Carr~-
was decided, a number of counties having district -type elections went 
,• 
to co·unty.-wide voting, retaining the districts, however, for residency 
purposes, i.n order to avoid problems attendant upon restructuring the 
districts to comply with the one-man· one-vote principle. Respondents' 
- . 
statement that the adoption of county-wide voting during the 1960's 
was for racially discriminatory purposes lacks evidence to support it. 
Fear and Intimidation • . Respondents also state on Pages 5-6, 
"Blacks were kept from the ballot through fear and intimidation, chicanery, 
economic controls, the discriminatory use of the literacy test, and 
·' 
.C 
Georgiats 'question and answer• test, and by other means. When the Voting 
Rights Act was passed, the County Commission recommended eliminating all 
the polling places in the County except one to thwart black voters. Even 
to this day, the County has taken every possible step to make registration 
as difficult as possible for black residents." 
There is no evidence whatever that fear or intimidation has ever been 
exercised against black citizens in Burke County with respect to voting, 
nor that chicanery, economic control, or discriminatory use of the literacy 
test was ever employed in the County. The only evidence on the use 
of the literacy test was that it was administered 'iery fairly, and that 
few blacks, not in excess of five percent of those taking it, were ever ' 
disqualified. There was evidence that one County Commissioner at one time 
proposed consolidating .Polling places, but there was no evidence whatever 
that this was to thwart black voters. The statement that the County has 
taken every possible step to make registration as difficult as possible 
for black resi~ents· is· completely without evidence, the evidence showing instead 
that when the. plaintiff in this case requested additional registration places, 
the County Commissioners provided them although the relatively small number 
of people registering at the three new sites since their establ isnment 
has raised serious doubt as to whether the registration sites were needed 
in the first instance. 
P. 0. Box 88 
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
PRESTON B. LEWIS 
LEWIS & LEWIS 
P. 0. Box 896 E. FREEMAN LEVERETT 
HEARD, LEVERETT & ADAMS 
Elberton, Georgia 30635 






Mn\f , 1978 
IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM 1978 
NO. 4- VI! 
QUENTIN ROGERS, - RAY DELAIGLE, ROBERT 
L. WEBSTER, CHARLES H. KITCHENS, AND 
THOMAS M. LOVETT, AS MEHBERS OF THE 
BOARD OF COMHISSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, 
GEORGIA, AND A. HOLLAND GNANN, OTTO B. 
JOHNSON AND \.JALL T. THOMPSON, AS MEMBERS 
OF THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF BURKE 
· COUNTY, GEORGIA 
APPLICANTS 
-VERSUS-
HERMAN LODGE, SHELLEY COLEMAN, LIZZIE M. SAMS, 
K. C. CHILDERS, REV. DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE 
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY AND LEVI CRANFORD 
RESPONDENTS 
APPLICATION FOR STAY NUMBER A417 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION 
TO APPLICATION FOR STAY 
1210 First National Bank Tower 
Atlanta, Georeia 30303 
(404)581-0403 
322 Tenth Street 
Augusta, Georgia 30902 
(404)828-2327 
52 Fairlie Street, N.W. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
(404)523-2721 
D~VID F. WALBERT 
ROBERT W. CL~LEN 
LAUGHLIN McDONALD 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION 
TO APPLICATION FOR STAY 
As the applicants point out, an order was entered in 
this action calling for the elimination of the at-large 
method of electing county commissioners in Burke County, 
Georgia. This order was supplemented by full findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. The clerk was directed to enter 
a final judgment by order of the district judge on October 30, 
1/ 
1978.-
The District Court denied applicants' motion for a 
stay, and they then moved the Circuit for a stay. After 
submission of briefs by both parties and consideration of the 
order of the District Court, a three-judge panel of the Fifth 
Circuit also denied applicants' motion for a stay. The defen-
dants are now in this Court seeking a stay, although this is 
not the routine situation where a party is appealing or apply-
ing for certiorari to this Court, and seeking a stay at the 
same time. Instead, the order of the trial court will be 
appealed directly to the Fifth Circuit for full consideration 
there, prior to any possible application for certiorari here. -
And it is extremely unlikely that this Court will ever hear 
this case on the merits. There is no issue here that would 
merit granting certiorari -- applicants complain for the most 
part of allegedly erroneous findings of fact by the trial 
court -- and there is no right to an appeal to this Court in 
this case. 
In their application, petitioners completely ignore 
the standards applicable in seeking the kind of extraordinary 
relief they now ask for. Even in the Court of Appeals, the 
standard for granting this kind of a stay is a stringent one: 
1/ Aoplicants ~rrongfully state that a stay is appro-
priate because final judgment was entered before full findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The original judgment was 
entered without authority by a deputy clerk, and that judgment 
was vacated by the District Court's order of October 30, 1978. 
Unless an appellant can demonstrate 
to the Court on such an emergency motion 
as this that there is great likelihood, 
approaching near certainty, that he will 
prevail when his case finally comes to 
be heard on the merits, he does not meet 
the standard which all courts recognize 
must be reached to warrant the entering 
of an emergency order of this kind. Greene 
v. Fair, 314 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1963). 
Of course, the standard for t~e present motion is even far more 
stringent because of its particularly extraordinary nature. 
Normally a single Justice will not intervene in a proceeding 
that is still pending in a Court of Appeals in the absence of 
the most compelling and unusual circumstances. And it is 
especially inappropriate to review a determination by the 
Court of Appeals that a District Court's order should not be 
stayed pending the appeal therefrom. Four judges, including 
the District Court judge who is most familiar with the facts 
and the law of this case, have unanimously concluded that a 
stay should not be granted. Justice Harlan clearly expressed 
the philosophy of this Court in passing on the present type 
~ . ·~ 
of application for interim action when a case is actively 
pending in a District Court. O'Rourkev. Levine, 80 S.Ct. 623 
(1960). Such action will be taken only "upon the weightiest 
consideration,'' and where there is "the most unequivocal 
showing of a right" to such interim relief. Even in cases that 
are directly appealable to this Court from a district court, 
stays are granted only in "unusual circumstances . " Breswick & 
Co. v. United States, 75 S._!::t. 912 U955). As Justice Harlan 
said there, single Justice's "stay powers . should be exer-
cised most sparingly, both in fairness to the prevailing parties 
below and out of deference to the Court. A single Justice may 
also be expected to give due regard to a lower court's denial 
of a stay." Those comments are particularly appropriate here, 
where not only the District Court denied the stay, but where 
the full panel of the Court of Appeals similarly considered 




Not only have the applicants completely failed to 
establish, or even allege, any "great likelihood, approaching 
near certainty" of success in their appeal, they do not even 
present a slight possibility of prevailing. This action is a 
voting dilution case where the plaintiffs successfully provedtha 
the maintenance of the at-large election system had the purpose 
and effect of completely obliterating the power of their vote 
contrary to the many holdings of this Court and the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-
770 (1973); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest 
County, 571 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1978); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 
209 (5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas 
County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978); Parnell v. Rapides Parish 
School Board, 563 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1977); Kirksey v. Board of 
Supervisors, 554 F. 2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 98 
S.Ct. 512 (1977); Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976); Zimmer v. 
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 12-97 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), aff'd sub 
nom, East Carroll School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) ~ 
There was extensive live testimony and hundreds of documentary 
exhibits presented to The Honorable Anthony A. Alaimo for his 
consideration in arriving at a decision. Of all the dilution 
cases that have been before courts of the Fifth Circuit, the 
evidence in this case of dilution far transcends that presented 
in any other case. In particular, the plaintiff~ in this case 
presented a great amount of- testiiDony and evidence concerning 
the current racial practices of the defendants and the current 
efforts of the defendants to keep blacks from entering the poli-
tical ·process on an eaual basis with the whites who have his-- . 
torically controlled the county. In other cases, including the 
Fifth Circuit's en bane decision in Kirksey v. Hinds County, 
supra, voting dilution has been predicated fully on a showing of 
past discrimination and the natural presumption of the continuing 
effect that results from such past discrimination. As Judge 
-3-
Clark stated in his opinion in the Forrest County case, a plain-
tiff may produce facts that are "concerned with the past" in 
order to "demonstrate a history of dilution of access by blacks 
to the political process," 571 F.2d at 955, and once that has 
been done, it is the duty of the federal court to adopt a 
reapportionment scheme that will "assure 'effective black 
minority participation in demecracy. "' Id. at 955. 
It is also interesting to note that the petitioners' 
application for stay differs from their application in the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals in one and only one 
respect. In those courts, the petitioners cried that the 
holding of this election would create undue confusion . (even 
though the timetable adopted by the District Court's order 
fit precisely within the timetable established by the Georgia 
state law that governs special elections). Now, plaintiffs make 
no allegation of confusion, and the reason for that is quite 
obvious. A stay at this point would not minimize confusion, 
but would instead cause unnecessary confusion. Pursuant to the 
Court's order, candidates began qualifying immediately, and 
the period of qualification has been closed for over two weeks. 
Candidates have been actively campaigning and everyone in the 
county is prepared for an election to occur almost immediately. 
Candida·tes have expended funds and presented their platforms 
in an effort to seek office. It would be a completely unjusti-
fied exercise of power for this Court to now step in, overrule 
the other judges who have considered this problem, and enter an 
order that would throw into confusion all the political expec-
tations of candidates and electorate only hours before the 
election itself is supposed to occur. That should certainly not 
be done where there is no opportunity to evaluate the evidence 
presented in the case, and this Court is presented only with the 
general allegations, gross hyperboles, and misrepresentations 
that are presented in petitioners' application. 
-4-
Evidence of Dilution and Discrimination . While the 
defendants contend in their motion that the White v. Regester 
and Zimmer factors have not been proved in this case, that 
contention is completely without merit. Not only has every 
single enhancing factor identified in any reported case been 
found to exist here, there is also compelling proof of all the 
so-called primary Zimmer factors. The evidence presented in 
this case is vastly greater than the evidence presented in the 
White v. Regester decision which upheld the claim of dilution 
in the at-large elections used in certain counties in the State 
of Texas. 
Although defendants represent that state policy 
favors countywide elections, that is not true. To the contrary, 
plaintiffs shmved at trial that, to the extent there is a state 
policy favoring at-large elections, it is specifically rooted 
in racial discrimination. This is shown by the many local 
governments in Georgia that switched from district elections to 
at-large elections shortly after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
was passed, the time when blacks were first allowed to vote 
in most counties in the State of Georgia. Moreover, it is 
simply irrelevant what the state policy might be, since this 
is a case involving federal constitutional and statutory 
questions, and it is certainly somewhat late for the appellants 
to contend that state laws are superior to federal statutes and 
constitutional provisions once discrimination has been shown. 
Defendants also make the extraordinary representation 
in their motion that there has never been any discrimination 
in the electoral and registration process. To the contrary, 
hardly any blacks were registered in Burke County before the 
Congress intervened by exercising the full force of federal 
power in the form of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Blacks 
were kept from the ballot through fear and intimidation, 
chicanery economic control, the discriminatory use of the 
literacy test and Georgia's "question and answer" test, and 
-5-
by other means. When the Voting Rights Act was passed, the 
Cotmty Commission recommended eliminating all the polling 
places in the county except one to thwart black voters. Even 
to this day, the county has taken every possible step to make 
registration as difficult as possible for black residents. 
The effect of these practices has been to continue the great 
underrepresentation of blacks -on the voter registration books. 
While the number of blacks of voting age in the county is 
almost the same as the number of whites of voting age, only 
38% of the registered voters in Burke County are black, while 
2/ 
62% are white.-
On t~e issue of responsiveness, plaintiffs proved 
that defendants had discriminated overwhelmingly against black 
residents in employment, appointments to boards, municipal 
services, voter registration, support of government-sponsored 
projects within the county, and virtually every other activity 
in which the county has participated in the past decade. Yet, 
defendants assert in their motion that the defendants have been 
responsive to black interests. To prevail on this point in 
their appeal, the defendants have the burden of showing that 
the trial court was "clearly erroneous" in concluding that the 
petitioners have been unresponsive to black interests. To pre-
vail on this application for stay, the petitioners would have 
to do far more. They have not done that, and in fact, this 
is not even the time or place to hear appellants challenge a 
District Court order claiming that the trial court's findings were 
clearly erroneous . That argument should be presented during 
the regular course of an appeal to the Court of Appeals, not 
to a single Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
2/ Registered voters, not population, are the 
"barometer"" of dilution. Zimmer v. UcKeithen, supra. 
-6-
Petitioners' Legal Objections. Petitioners point out 
that the City of Mobile decision is pending before the Supreme 
Court at this time, and they feel that that is a sufficient 
ground for a stay here. But certainly the pendency of a voting 
rights case before the Supreme Court cannot be the basis for 
a stay, or stavs would be granted invariably since there is 
nearly always one or more such cases pending before the Supreme 
3/ 
Court.-
Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that any issue 
presented in the Mobile appeal could affect the present case. 
The Mobile case differs from all other dilution cases in one 
and only one respect, and that is the fact that the specialized 
city commission form of government was disestablished by the 
district court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit after full review, and a city council form of 
government was put in its place in order to remedy the dilution 
that had occurred. Thus, there is a very substantial question 
presented for the Supreme Court as to the limit on the 
equitable power in a dilution case. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
No. 77-1844, 4J U.S.L.W. 3190 (1978) (questions presented in 
4/ 
certiorari petition).-
In this case, no modification in the actual form and 
operation of the government will be effected in any way by the 
District Court's order. The sole change will be that the 
county commissioners will be elected from the subdistricts with-
in the county, rather than-from the county at large. There can 
be no question that this degree of relief is authorized in a 
dilution case, since that is precisely what the United States 
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in its White v. Regester 
3/ The Supreme Court has held that it is a gross abuse 
of discretion, r.1arranting mandamus relief, to routinely stay 
election orders because other election cases are pending in the 
Supreme Court. Conner v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1976). 
4/ It is unlikely that this Court is concerned about 
the "purpose or intent" issue, since it has already rejected 
certiorari in the Fifth Circuit's en bane decision on that issue ---in Kirksey v. Hinds County, supra. 
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decision five years ago. 
Secondly, defendants contend that their at-large 
election system is insulated from a dilution attack because 
it has been in effect for 67 years and was enacted at a time 
when blacks were disenfranchised through other, cruder means 
in Burke County. This argument was rejected out of hand by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomasville Branch of 
the NAACP v. Thomas County, Georgia, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 
1978). The defendants' contention is also explicitly contrary 
to the Supreme Court's decision in White v. Regester again, 
since in that case, the multi-member district system invalidated 
by the District Court had been in effect since the turn of the 
century. E.g., Vernon's Tex. Stat., 1914, Art. 26. Similarly, 
this Court struck down a Tennessee apportionment statute in 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which had been in effect, 
unchanged since 1901. Clearly, in a voting case based on dilu-
tion and one-person/one-vote arguments, the date of the enact-
ment of the legislati~n is g~nerally insignifica~t. If there 
are intervening facts which cause the challenged apportionment 
scheme to disc!iminate against certain groups, and particularly 
where the discrimination is based on race, then the election 
scheme is subject to challenge, and the federal courts have the 
power to remedy the illegality. 
Defendants also cite to the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in wi·se v. Lipscomb, 57 L.E.2d 411 (1978). Wise 
provides defendants no ground for appeal, however, much less a 
certain ground. · Wise indicated that, in the circumstances of 
that case. it would have been appropriate to allow local govern-
ment an opportunity to reapportion itself after the declaration 
5/ 
of unconstitutionality.- Wise expressly recognized two excep-
tions, even under the facts of that case. A district court 
5/ The defendants complain they did not have an oppor-
tunity to present a plan, but the Court did request that the 
parties present plans at the hearing. The defendants simply 
failed to tender as to that request any plan that was remotely 
acceptable under the rules of evidence, much less one that 
comported with the Constitution. 
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need not stay its hand where there are imminent elections, and 
a district court need not stay its hand where the legislative 
body fails to undertake reapportionment. Both exceptions apply 
here since elections were very "imminent" and were scheduled for 
November. The trial court's order calls for elections to be held 
simultaneously with those regular elections. The second excep-
tion is also applicable since the defendants have already 
announced their intention not to pursue a legislative remedy. 
In the trial court, their brief stated their ·intention to appeal 
to the Court of Appeals and then to this Court. The petitioners 
admit that that process will require years, so the District 
Court would obviously have to act, at the very latest, a year 
from now in advance of the 1980 elections. Under these cir-
cumstances, Wise certainly does not require the District Court 
to blind itself to the admitted refusal of the defendants to 
undertake voluntary reapportionment. 
Moreover, Wise expressly omitted any discussion of 
the significance of Section ·5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 since that issue had not been raised there. In the present 
case, the application of Section 5 is especially important and 
again renders the dictum in Wise inapplicable. For one thing, 
Section 5 is a clear congressional finding and mandate to the 
courts to ensure that voting-related remedies be adopted and 
implemented with as much haste as possible in any jurisdiction 
where Section 5 applies, as it does in Burke County. Congress 
imposed Section 5 restrictions only -in those areas where it 
determined that resistance to equal voting rights was most 
egregious. The intention of Congress was to ensure rapid reme-
dies in voting litigation in any Section 5 covered area. South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
Moreover, Section 5 virtually precludes the volun-
tary solution suggested by Wise. Any such effort by a state 
legislature could be effected only upon federal approval under 
Section 5. The Wise test, whi.ch would have the District Court 
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consider whether the proffered plan was constitutional, simply 
cannot be applied in any jurisdiction where Section 5 is in 
effect. 
And finally, the petitioners' suggestion that Wise 
will be the end of dilution cases for any state subdivision is 
certainly erroneous. The four Justices that commented in Wise 
that there had not yet been a-definitive decision applying White 
v. Regester to such political subdivisions certainly cannot be 
translated into an opinion by the Court that there is no such 
cause of action. No case by any court, and certainly by this 
Court, has ever held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
do not apply to subdivisions of a state, and the four con-
curring Justices in the Wise case certainly do not state any 
such opinion. Petitioners seem to forget that a civil war 
was fought in order to obtain the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments. It is an extraordinary suggestion to 
imply that this Court would ever effectively repeal those 
amendments by holding ·that they did not apply to .elections for 
subdivisions of a .state. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has 
for political subdivisions 
held that at-large elections/may be objected to under Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Allen v. State Board of 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Perkins v. Hatthews, 400 U.S. 
379 (1971). But anything that can be challenged under Section 
5 of that Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c, can surely be challenged as 
well under Section 2 of that Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973, since the 
substantive language is essentially the same. See also, 42 
U.S.C. §1971. The only difference is that the plaintiffs have 
the burden of proof in a §1973 case, while the government has 
the burden of proof in a Section 5 proceeding. In this case, 
the plaintiffs have rel~ed on the statutory provisions, as well 
as the constitutional provisions. Thus, even if a completely 
unprecedented decision was rendered by the Supreme Court to the 
effect that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not 
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apply to local government, the plaintiffs here would still 
prevail because of their statutory claims. Cf. Nevett v. Sides, 
571 F.2d 209, 213 n. 3, 237 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Thus, the District Court's decision to require a 
prompt remedy to the clearly unconstitutional election system 
here is entirely in accordance with the decisions of the Fifth 
Circuit, and it is most certainly in accordance with the 
decisions of this Court. In Parnell v. Rapides Parish School 
Board, 563 F.2d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit held 
that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court to 
allow incumbents to hold office while awaiting far distant 
elections. In many other cases, the Court of Appeals has simi-
larly granted immediate and summary relief in voting discrimina-
tion cases. Many of these cases are compiled by Judge Dawkins in 
the Louisiana case of Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192, 1201 
(W.D.La. 1974), aff'd, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976). The 
Fifth Circuit and the District Courts of the Fifth Circuit 
have far more knowledge than this Court, or a single Justice 
acting in this Court, of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the egregious-voting discrimination that remains in the South 
today. Those Courts should be accorded a normal courtesy of 
allowing them to pass on any arguments presented by the peti-
tioners before intervention by this Court. The arguments 
raised by petitioners simply are not appropriately raised in 
this Court. 
Finally, repondents cannot fail to mention that 
there are serious and substantial misrepresentations on many 
grounds in the petitioners' motion. Possibly the most egregious 
is the shocking allegation that the parties and the Court have 
"deliberately gerrymandered" a plan to dilute the white vote 
and to guarantee election of certain individuals in the county. 
Although the very plan adopted by the District Court was pro-
duced first well over a year ago, at no time prior to final 
judgment in the trial court had there ever been a single 
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objection to that plan by defendants. Now, in this Court, and 
without any shred of supporting evidence or testimony or even 
insinuation in the trial court, petitioners' attorneys make 
these completely improper accusations. Misrepresentations and 
arguments of this sort, particularly where there has been no 
prior objection or supporting evidence tendered into the record, 
are no basis for consideration -by this Court. To the contrary, 
they are a firm basis for sanctions to be tak~n against the 
offending individuals, for members of the Bar should certainly 
not be condoned when they make such malicious and unprofes-
sional accusations, particularly where the sole purpose of 
counsels' misrepresentations is to induce this Court to act 
under a ·misimpression and assist the defendants in perpetuating 
the white supremacy that has continued to exist in Burke County, 
Georgia, to the present date. 
Petitioners make many other factual misrepresentations, 
some of which are shorn of their substance simply by reviewing 
the District Court's order. Among these is the extraordinary 
notion that blacks have been able to register and vote in 
Burke County ''without difficulty" for at least the past 30 years. 
That representation has no relation to the evidence actually 
presented in this case. As the District Court notes, blacks 
were virtually a voting nonentity prior to federal intervention 
in 1965 by way of the Voting Rights Act. Defendants' own 
witnesses admitted that the Georgi,a "question and answer" test 
-- the very purpose of "t-Thich was indisputably to prevent blacks 
from registering -- eliminated many, many prospective regis-
trants. Petitioners also failed to mention that public facili-
ties in Burke County are still segregated by race, 115 years 
after the Civil War, and 14 years after passage of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. They fail to mention that, according to the 
very testimony of one of the defendant county commissioners 
the county commissioners still refer to blacks as "niggers" in 
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Burke County Commission meetings. Defendants also fail to 
refer to the days and days of other testimony as to the intense 
racism that has characterized Burke County up to the present, 
evidence of racism that makes all the testimony presented in 
this Court's White v. Reg~ster decision pale by comparison. 
In sum, there is no ground here that would conceivably 
justify the extraordinary act1on requested. Action by this 
Court at this time would not only be unjustifiable under the 
law and facts, it would cause great confusion in the orderly 
election process of Burke County. Nor can defendants possibly 
complain that the election plan adopted by the District Court 
is an improper one. While petitioners state that blacks pre-
dominate in two districts, the percentages in the court-
ordered reapportionment plan are not particularly different 
than in the plan tendered by defendants themselves. It is 
inconceivable how defendants can now challenge those very 
numbers. 
The true point of petitioners' application is probably 
most clearly shown by their admission of the possibility that 
this case will-be settled if county commissioners are elected 
under an election plan that does in fact give blacks equal 
access to the political system. Since the at-large system 
used completely excludes blacks from political input, there is 
no possibility of settlement or fair treatment of the plaintiffs' 
interests as long as the at-large system is maintained. But 
as defendants admit, election of county commissioners under a 
fair district-based election system would substantially tend to 
undercut the present control of the white supremacists in Burke 
County, raising a realistic possibility of fair treatment of 
the interests of black citizens, including settlement of this 
suit and the adoption and continued use of a nondiscriminatory 
election system. The defendants' interest in a stay, · and their 
very interest in an appeal at all, is solely and specifically 
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to perpetuate the kind of white supremacy that has been the rule 
of the Burke County Commission, and which can be remedied 
solely by the kind of relief granted by the District Court. 
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